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JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN JUVENILE COURTS
AND CHILD WELFARE AGENCIES: THE UNEASY
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSTITUTIONAL
CO-PARENTS
BRUCE

I.

A.

BOYER*

INTRODUCTION

Both juvenile courts responsible for adjudicating charges of child
abuse and neglect and child welfare agencies commonly called upon
to act as legal guardians for displaced children increasingly have become overwhelmed by the enormity of their respective tasks. The
number of neglected, abused and dependent children coming under
the auspices of juvenile courts and state and local child welfare agencies nationwide has soared in the last decade,' placing heavy burdens
on both institutions. Juvenile courts, particularly in large urban areas,
have been swamped by increasing caseloads that challenge their ability to provide effective oversight of dependent, neglected, and abused
children. 2 Child welfare agencies have been perennially underfunded
and increasingly beset by litigation,' reflecting growing concerns
* Clinical Instructor and Supervising Attorney, Children and Family Justice Center,
Northwestern University School of Law. The author wishes to thank Annette Appell, Julie
Biehl, Bernardine Dohrn, Thomas Geraghty, and Victor Rosenblum for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
1. Nationally, between the years 1980 and 1986, reported cases of child maltreatment
increased by approximately 66%. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, STUDY
FINDINGS: STUDY OF NATIONAL INCIDENCE AND PREVALENCE OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 32 to 3-3 (1988). Since 1986, both the total number and the per capita rate of reported
cases of child maltreatment have risen steadily. NATIONAL COMM. TO PREVENT CHILD
ABUSE, CURRENT TRENDS IN CHILD ABUSE REPORTING AND FATALITIES:

THE RESULTS OF THE

1993 ANNUAL FIry STATE SURVEY 5 (1994). The National Committee to Prevent Child
Abuse estimated that, in 1993, almost three million cases of child maltreatment were reported-roughly 4.5% of all children in the United States. Id. In Illinois, the number of
children in foster care statewide increased from approximately 25,000 in 1991 to more
than 41,000 in 1994. Susan Kuczka, DCFS Questioned on Reform Vows; Judge, ACLU Say It's
Too Slow on Change, CHI. TRIB., June 28, 1994, at Chicagoland 1.
2. For a five-year period ending in 1992, new petitions in dependency, neglect, and
abuse cases in 27 reporting states rose almost 20%, from approximately 229,000 to more
than 271,000. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS, ANNUAL REPORT 1992 30 (1994); see also Leonard P. Edwards, Improving Implementation
of the FederalAdoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Juv. & FAM. COURTJ., v.45, no.
3, at 3, 16-19 (1994) (describing problems faced by judges monitoring child welfare agencies responsible for neglected, abused, and dependent children).
3. See, e.g., Angela R. v. Clinton, 999 F.2d 320, 326 (8th Cir. 1993) (vacating consent
decree entered in a class action suit challenging the administration of child welfare pro-
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about the ability of such agencies to manage the burdens placed upon
them.
grams in Arkansas); Del A. v. Edwards, 855 F.2d 1148, 1149 (5th Cir.) (affirming denial of
Louisiana Department of Health and Human Resources's motion for summary judgment,
thereby allowing action challenging state foster care programs to proceed), reh 'g en bane
granted, 862 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1988), appeal dismissed, 867 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1989); Lynch
v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504, 514 (1st Cir. 1983) (affirming injunction entered by district court
requiring Massachusetts Department of Social Services to change the manner in which it
supervises foster care); Baby Neal v. Casey, 821 F. Supp. 320, 340-41 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (upholding, in part, right of children in custody of Philadelphia Department of Human Services to challenge departmental procedures by class action); LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F.
Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1991), aff'd in part and remanded in part sub nom. LaShawn A. v. Kelly, 990
F.2d 1319, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (affirming, on the basis of District of Columbia law, decision in favor of a class of children who attacked child-welfare system as "characterized by
ineptness and indifference, inordinate caseloads and insufficient funds"), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 691 (1994); B.H. v. Ryder, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1405 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (ruling that
children in custody of Illinois Department of Children and Family Services had the right to
challenge the state's procedures in federal court).
The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992),
may signal a limitation of federal court review for systemic problems in child welfare. Suter
involved a class action suit against the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services
for failure to provide services to children who were the subjects of neglect, dependency, or
abuse petitions. The action was based on the "reasonable efforts" provision of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-628, 670-79a (1988 & Supp. V 1993)), which requires child
welfare agencies funded under the Act to make reasonable efforts to avoid the need to
place children in foster care. 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a)(15); Suter, 112 S. Ct. at 1362. In reversing
the decision of the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court concluded that "42 U.S.C.
§ 671(a)(15) neither confers an enforceable private right on its beneficiaries nor creates
an implied cause of action on their behalf." Id. at 1370.
However, it is not clear whether the Supreme Court's decision in Suter eliminates completely the private right of action under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act.
Compare Wildauer v. Frederick County, 993 F.2d 369, 373 (4th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)
("[T] here is no private right of action under the [Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare
Act].") and Baby Neal v. Casey, 821 F. Supp. 320, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (ruling that
"[pilaintiffs may not bring an action under the Adoption Act itself or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
alleged failures of the Commonwealth to implement any feature of its plan which has been
approved by the Secretary [of Health and Human Services]") with Howe v. Ellenbecker, 8
F.3d 1258, 1263 (8th Cir. 1993) (distinguishing Suter as referring only to the "reasonable
efforts" provision of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act in holding that a class
of Native Americans had a private cause of action against the State for failure to provide
certain benefits required under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-669) andAlbiston v. Maine Comm'r of Human Servs., 7 F.3d
258, 267 (1st Cir. 1993) (distinguishing Suter as referring only to the "reasonable efforts"
clause of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act in holding that a private cause of
action exists against the State under § 1983 to enforce prompt disbursements of child support under 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-687) and Angela R. ex rel. Hesselbein v. Clinton, 999 F.2d 320,
323-24 (8th Cir. 1993) (describing Suter as "holding that 42 U.S.C. §§ 671 (a) (9) and (15),
portions of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, do not create private rights
enforceable under § 1983," but leaving open the question of whether a private right of
action might be created by other sections or subsections of the Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Act).
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These trends provide a pointed and pressing context for analyzing dispute resolution mechanisms in child welfare, and for determining where lies ultimate responsibility for making critical decisions
about the welfare and future of abused and neglected children in foster care. Once a court has determined through the adjudicatory process that state intervention is necessary to protect a child from neglect
or abuse, the responsibility for developing and implementing an appropriate long-term dispositional4 plan is commonly shared by child
welfare agencies and juvenile courts, both of which are increasingly
called upon to play the awkward role of institutional substitute parent.
At its best, the relationship between these institutions functions
smoothly, with both recognizing their mutual dependence and sharing an understanding of the boundaries of their responsibilities. Yet
when conflicts arise over which institution has ultimate authority for
managing the lives of foster children, there is little consistency in the
application of doctrinal tools for resolving the conflicts. The nature
of this relationship-with juvenile courts and child welfare agencies
carrying continuing and overlapping responsibilities-not only distinguishes it from the typical relationship between an executive agency
and a supervising court, but it also renders the application of traditional tools of public and administrative law to the field of child welfare awkward and ineffective.
It is the purpose of this Article to consider the tensions that arise
from this realm of shared responsibility, and to suggest an analytical
framework for resolving these institutional conflicts that is better
suited to the needs ofjuvenile law and practice than many of the tools
commonly applied to the resolution of jurisdictional disputes.' The
stakes over such conflicts are high. Dispositional issues encompass
critical decisions about matters such as the placement and support of
neglected and abused children, and the harm to children when these
systems fail is often irreparable. To provide some context for this discussion, the following hypothetical account illustrates one of the most
4. The term "dispositional" is used herein to refer to the range of issues that must be
addressed in developing an appropriate plan for a child who has been found to be neglected, abused, or dependent. Such issues most commonly include the determination of
where the child shall live, who shall act as the child's legal guardian, what is the most
appropriate long-term goal (i.e., "permanency plan" for the child), and what services
should be provided to the family or the child or both to move toward the designated permanency plan.
5. The expanding numbers of state wards nationwide and the gravity of the task of
institutional parenting do more than provide texture to the discussion of this tension. The
measure of the efficacy of any framework of analysis is its ability to accommodate the realities of child welfare systems which, in many localities, are strained almost to the breaking

point.
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common subjects of jurisdictional disputes between juvenile courts
and child welfare agencies: the placement of children in substitute
care.
A.

"Patrick"

At age six-and-a-half, shortly after he was freed for adoption, Patrick 6 was placed in the pre-adoptive foster home of Ms. Glenn, a
newly-licensed and unmarried woman with no children of her own.
In the three years prior to this placement, Patrick had lived continually under the legal custody of the state child welfare agency, which
had placed him in a total of six separate foster homes.7 His frequent
changes in placement had occurred for a variety of reasons, including
physical abuse by a foster parent, the reluctance of another foster parent to adopt him, and problems arising from the boy's difficult behavior. As is common with children raised under such circumstances,
Patrick was very guarded with adults and found it difficult to form
relationships.' With dramatic understatement, a social assessment
summarizing Patrick's condition prior to his placement with Ms.
Glenn reported that he had "no significant emotional attachments."
Ms. Glenn stayed at home with Patrick, devoting considerable
time and attention to his care. Like many foster parents, she quickly
became dissatisfied with the level of involvement and the quality of
case management offered by the agency. As a result, she took pains to
reach her own conclusions about Patrick's needs and about the appropriate level of agency involvement necessary to meet those needs. Her
assessment of Patrick was bolstered by the gradual abatement of the
behavioral problems that had contributed to several prior placement
changes. Because Patrick seemed to respond to her attentions, Ms.
Glenn eventually reached the conclusion that, although Patrick was
6. The following account of the life of "Patrick" is fictitious. The story represents a
composite description of a child's life in foster care, drawn from the author's experience in
representing clients in neglect and abuse proceedings.
7. Multiple placements have long been one of the unfortunate hallmarks of foster
care. See LEROY H. PELTON, FOR REASONS OF POVERTY, A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC
CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 55-56 (1989) (describing various studies doc-

umenting the frequency of foster care placement changes).
8. Studies and commentators repeatedly have identified loyalty conflicts, identity confusion, and difficulty in forming emotional attachments as maladies often associated with
children raised in foster care. These problems are prevalent among children who have
experienced multiple placement changes. See Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of
"Neglected" Children: Standardsfor Removal of Childrenfrom Their Homes, Monitoring the Status
of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of ParentalRights, 28 STAN. L. REv. 625, 667-74
(1976) (discussing harm caused to children by multiple temporary placements); PELTON,
supra note 7, at 58 (same).
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troubled, he had been unfairly labeled as behaviorally disordered and
subjected to a battery of intrusive tests and counseling sessions. His
needs, she felt, could best be met by an involved parent figure offering a loving home, tempered by a healthy dose of authoritarianism.
After twelve months, Ms. Glenn was able to develop a bond that was
unprecedented in Patrick's life.
While Ms. Glenn's relationship with Patrick evolved in a generally
positive way, her relationship with Patrick's caseworkers was oppositional from the outset. Ms. Glenn felt that the agency was unresponsive to Patrick's needs, and Patrick's caseworkers felt that Ms. Glenn
understood neither the severity of the disruption of his early childhood nor the depth of his behavioral and emotional difficulties. Because of Patrick's continued disciplinary problems at school, his
caseworkers attributed his relatively compliant demeanor at home to
manipulative skills he learned as an aid to emotional survival in foster
care. The agency also became increasingly concerned about Ms.
Glenn's repeated failure to transport Patrick to his counseling sessions
on a regular basis. Because her relationship with the boy seemed generally positive, however, the agency continued to move forward toward
finalizing an adoption.
One year after his placement with Ms. Glenn, Patrick set fire to
his school auditorium and caused considerable damage. The agency
responded by hospitalizing Patrick in a diagnostic inpatient psychiatric program. Patrick's current caseworker-the third since he was
placed with Ms. Glenn-visited the foster parent at her home to inform her of this development. Ms. Glenn berated her caseworker, Ms.
Turner, for grossly overestimating the severity of Patrick's condition.
Upon returning to her office, Ms. Turner promptly called the hospital
and instructed the staff not to permit contact between Patrick and Ms.
Glenn, because of her volatility and out of concern that she might try
to remove him from the hospital. Ms. Glenn attempted to visit Patrick, but was not allowed to see him. Over the next few days, she repeatedly and unsuccessfully attempted to speak with Ms. Turner,
leaving increasingly angry and threatening messages.
Five days after Patrick's hospitalization, Ms. Turner, her supervisor, and the hospital's staff social worker, met to discuss Patrick's fiture. They felt that, despite his obvious attachment to Ms. Glenn,
Patrick should not return to her home because of her inability to ensure that his emotional and psychological needs could be met, and
because of her lack of cooperation with the agency. The team was
heavily influenced by Ms. Turner's emotional account of her contacts
with Ms. Glenn, and by her statement expressing concern for her
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physical safety during her last visit to Ms. Glenn's home. The team
concluded that placement in a highly-structured residential facility
would be most appropriate. Ms. Turner identified a suitable group
home two hundred miles away, with an opening available in two
weeks, and promptly notified Ms. Glenn and Patrick's law guardian 9
of the agency's decision to place Patrick in this home and to suspend
adoption proceedings.
Upon learning of the agency's decision, Patrick's law guardian
met with Patrick and Ms. Glenn and was persuaded that, despite Ms.
Glenn's difficulties with the agency, Patrick's best interests lay in returning to Ms. Glenn's home. The law guardian also concluded that
the residential placement contemplated by the agency was unnecessarily restrictive. Accordingly, the guardian contacted Ms. Turner and
requested that the agency delay Patrick's placement and reinstate contact with Ms. Glenn. The agency refused.
The law guardian considered seeking review of the agency's decision through its internal administrative appeals process.1 0 She rejected this tactic, however, out of fear that Patrick would be moved out
of state before such an appeal could be resolved and would be
harmed irreparably as a result. Instead, she applied to the juvenile
court judge for an order barring Patrick's placement in the distant
group home and directing the agency to allow Ms. Glenn to visit Patrick in the hospital while a more detailed evaluation was being completed. The guardian received support from Patrick's psychologist of
three years, who was prepared to testify that the boy would be devastated by separation from Ms. Glenn.
The agency objected to the law guardian's request, arguing to the
judge that it had been given responsibility for managing Patrick's care
and placement when it was assigned as his legal custodian; that it was
within the agency's discretion to decide where Patrick should live; and
that the court lacked any authority to interfere with the exercise of
that discretion. The agency also argued that both Patrick and Ms.
Glenn could seek review of the decision to change the boy's placement through its internal administrative review processes, and thatjudicial review circumventing these processes would be premature and
9. Law guardians, or guardians ad litem, are commonly appointed byjuvenile courts in
neglect and abuse proceedings to represent the interests of children who are subjects of
such proceedings. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 705, para. 405/2-17 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
10. Federal regulations implementing the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act
of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 20-28, 670-6 7 9a (1988 & Supp. V 1993), require states receiving
money under the Act to have in place a system providing for administrative review of challenged decisions through a fair hearing process. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(12) (1988); 45
C.F.R. §§ 205.10, 1355.30 (1993).
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constitute undue interference with the agency's authority. The law
guardian responded that Patrick would be moved before any administrative review could be completed; that once moved, the boy would be
irreparably harmed; and that the juvenile court, as the institution ultimately responsible for safeguarding Patrick's best interests, was both
able and bound to take steps to protect those interests when the
agency failed to do so.
With Patrick anxiously awaiting the outcome of his case, the court
is thus confronted with a fundamental challenge to the scope of its
legal authority: should it, by virtue of its statutory obligation to protect Patrick's well-being, consider a request either to bar the agency
from placing Patrick in the chosen group home or to direct the
agency to return Patrick to Ms. Glenn?
B.

The Conflict of Institutional Co-Parents

As suggested by Patrick's case, the relationship between juvenile
courts and child welfare agencies is not always easy, and the boundaries of their respective responsibilities are not always clear. Statutory
schemes typically designate certain functions that are either distinctively judicial or distinctively administrative. In cases of child abuse
and neglect, juvenile courts normally bear sole responsibility for adjudicating charges against parents and, in the "dispositional" realm, for
appointing a legal guardian for a child under court jurisdiction."
Child welfare agencies, on the other hand, typically bear exclusive responsibility for such matters as investigating charges and licensing of
substitute care homes.'" For many dispositional issues, however, the
statutorily-defined boundaries of responsibilities between court and
agency are ambiguous and marked by significant overlap." Commen11. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 705, para. 405/2-21 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (describing
juvenile court's authority to adjudicate charges of abuse, neglect, or dependency); id. para.
405/2-22 (providing juvenile courts with the power to determine "the proper disposition
best serving the interests of the minor and the public").
12. See, e.g., Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 325, para.
5/1 to 5/11.7 (granting the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services the power
to investigate charges of neglect and abuse and to provide protective services); id. ch. 225,
para. 10/4 (giving the Illinois Department of Children and Family Service the authority to
issue licenses to child care facilities); see also id. ch. 20, para. 505/5 (describing general
authority of Department of Children and Family Services).
13. The Arkansas Supreme Court has stated:
The jurisdictions of the juvenile court and DHS overlap in numerous and varied
areas. One such area involves family services, which is defined in the Juvenile
Code ...

as

. .

. "including, but not limited to: child care; homemaker services;

crisis counseling; cash assistance; transportation; family therapy; physical, psychiatric, or psychological evaluation; counseling; or treatment, provided to ajuvenile
or his family."
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tators often assume that the jurisdiction of juvenile courts over the
more specific aspects of the implementation of a dispositional plan is
limited, 14 and indeed many courts have refused to interfere with specific dispositional decisions of administrative agencies, characterizing
them as falling within a protected realm of agency discretion. 5 Other
courts, however, interpreting notably similar statutory schemes, have
recognized that juvenile courts are vested with broad dispositional
powers that include the power to second-guess-or even directagency action on specific dispositional matters.' 6
What accounts for this variance of views on the proper scope of
juvenile court powers? Differences among specific statutory schemes,
while significant in some cases, do not adequately explain this dissension. To some extent, the range of views among appellate courts
called upon to resolve these turf wars may be attributed to the awkward application to the juvenile context of conventional tools of administrative and public law, including the separation of powers
doctrine and the prudential administrative doctrine of exhaustion of
remedies. Many reviewing courts have sought to apply these principles to the unique relationship between juvenile courts and child welfare agencies within the context of broad and imprecisely drawn
statutory schemes. The result is often a prohibition on juvenile courts
17
making decisions in areas considered within the agency's discretion.
. Where agency judgments generally can be relied upon to meet
the needs of the children and families they serve, a high degree of
deference to child welfare agencies is a desirable end. However, as a
practical reality, such deference may become a significant cause for
concern when state or local child welfare agencies-for whatever reason-prove unable to provide adequate or appropriate attention or
resources to the children and families they serve.' Under these cirArkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Clark, 802 S.W.2d 461, 463 (Ark. 1991) (quoting ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-27-303(17) (Michie 1991)).
14. See, e.g., Alice Shotton & Marcia Henry, Despite Statutory Mandate, Child Welfare Fair
Hearings are Rare, 12 YOUTH L. NEws, Sept.-Oct. 1991, at 1, 2 (arguing that administrative
fair hearings offer opportunities to resolve issues that are not appropriate for resolution in
juvenile courts).
15. See infra Part II.A., discussing judicial deference to agency decisions.
16. See infra Part II.B., discussing judicial intervention.
17. See infra Part II.A.
18. Patrick's story suggests one way in which considerations apart from the best interests of the individual child-such as conflicts between workers and caretakers-can affect
an agency's judgment. Budgetary limitations can also constrain an agency's ability to serve
its charges, even to the point where an agency is unable to discharge its legislatively mandated duties. In the last several years, litigation has proliferated charging agencies nationwide with a failure to provide minimal services for children and families enmeshed in the
child welfare system. See supra note 3.

1995]

JUVENILE COURTS AND CHILD WELFARE AGENCIES

385

cumstances, the results of judicial abdication have ranged from fostering sluggishness in moving toward permanency plans that are either
created or sanctioned by the courts,' 9 to judicial misfeasance in protecting the welfare of state wards.2" Stated simply, the doctrinal tools
used to resolve tensions between administrative agencies and their judicial monitors have failed to take adequate account of either the peculiarities of juvenile law or the practical problems that plague the
field of child welfare.
It is the thesis of this Article that ultimate responsibility should
rest with the juvenile court for determining when deference to administrative decisionmaking is appropriate, and that decisions over when
to exercise such deference must account for the full range of circumstances that inform each case. While deference in many circumstances is essential to the court's smooth operation, juvenile courts
must answer finally for the welfare of children assigned to the care of
state agencies and must be given powers commensurate to discharge
that responsibility effectively. Though jurisdictional tensions may become manifest through a wide range of dispositional issues, this Article focuses on the resolution of a specific dispositional question:
where lies ultimate responsibility for the placement of children who
are subject to juvenile court jurisdiction and who are under the legal
guardianship of a state child welfare agency?2 a Amidst a range of
19. See Gerald E. Radcliffe, Is the Separation ofPowers DoctrineAccountablefor the Foster Care

Drift of Ohio Children?, 14 OHio N.U. L. REv. 179, 184 (1987) (discussing inadequacies in
permanency planning for children that led the Ohio legislature to enact corrective
legislation).
20. See, e.g., In reJ.S., 571 A.2d 658 (VL 1989) (finding that Juvenile Court lacked the
authority to enjoin the agency from placing the minor child in a residential home plagued
by incidents of sexual abuse of younger children) (discussed infra notes 163-174 and accompanying text); see also Edwards, supra note 2, at 3 ("[M]any social service agencies do
not effectively deliver preventive and reunification services to families, . . juvenile court
oversight of social service delivery has been ineffective or nonexistent, and... many juvenile courts do not ensure that children in out-of-home care attain a permanent home in a
timely fashion.").
21. Questions regarding the parameters of juvenile court/agency relationships have
arisen in a variety of other contexts, such as the power of a juvenile court to order an
agency to provide it with extraordinary reports, compare In re F.B., 564 N.E.2d 173, 181-82
(Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (vacating court order requiring Illinois Department of Children and
Family Services to provide information regarding abused, neglected, and dependent children to the Juvenile Court) with In reJ.A., 406 N.W.2d 372, 375 (Wis. 1987) (holding that
Wisconsin Juvenile CourtJudge had the power to order reports and investigations relating
to foster care placements provided the reasons for the court's request are delineated); to
direct an agency with respect to the provision of specific services, see Arkansas Dep't of
Human Servs. v. Clark, 802 S.W.2d 461, 462-64 (Ark. 1991) (upholding the power of the
Arkansas Juvenile Court to require the Department of Human Services to provide prescription medication not covered by Medicaid, access to food, financial assistance, and transportation services); In re Lawrence M., No. 1-93-3113 et al., 1995 IIl. App. LEXIS 33, at *9 (Jan.
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complex and interrelated issues bearing on the development of an
appropriate dispositional plan, the question of placement offers a
comparatively discrete and straightforward context in which to consider how best to resolve jurisdictional tensions between courts and
administrative agencies.
Part II of this Article describes the statutory context in which juvenile courts and child welfare agencies operate, outlining the significant common elements of governing statutory schemes. Part III
describes the two principal schools of thought applied in resolving
jurisdictional tensions between juvenile courts and administrative
agencies, and reviews the dominant considerations that have guided
appellate decisions. Part TV offers an analysis and critique of the reasoning that has moved some courts toward a view favoring judicial restraint. Finally, Part V proposes a framework for resolving
jurisdictional tensions that heeds legitimate concerns for administrative autonomy and judicial economy, and, at the same time preserves
the flexibility that is an essential component of effective judicial oversight. Part V also suggests several basic criteria that might be utilized
by a court in determining when judicial review of a particular issue
should preempt available administrative review processes. This discussion, it is hoped, will guide both legislative and judicial efforts to define the complex relationship between these two institutional coparents.
II.

STATUTORY CONTEXT

Responsibility for the delineation of shared authority between juvenile courts and child welfare agencies lies in the first instance with
state legislatures. Indeed, there can be no doubt either that state legislatures retain a great deal of flexibility in fashioning the parameters
of court/agency relationships, or that courts are bound to follow the
mandates of the legislature when those mandates can be clearly discerned. An understanding of the legislative context in which court/
agency relationships are defined is thus a prerequisite to comprehending the general principles of governance in this arena.
20, 1995) (upholding juvenile court orders directing agency to provide inpatient drug
treatment); or to order an agency to consent to an adoption, see Bland v. Department of
Children & Family Servs., 490 N.E.2d 1327, 1332 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (ruling that adoption
petition should be granted if the refusal of the Department of Children and Family services
to consent to an adoption was "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable and without merit");
In re Adoption of Savory, 430 N.E.2d 301, 302-03 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (holding that the
refusal of the State Guardian to consent to an adoption did not automatically divest the
court ofjurisdiction to review that decision).
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Typically, statutory schemes governing juvenile courts share several common elements which help to define court/agency relationships. First, juvenile courts generally are charged with a broad
responsibility to safeguard the welfare of dependent children. In Illinois, for example, this charge is reflected both in a general statement
of the purpose and policy of the act governing juvenile courts and in a
broad statement of the court's responsibility to fashion an appropriate
dispositional plan. The former provision, which is characteristic of
many state statutory schemes, provides that:
The purpose of this Act is to secure for each minor subject
hereto such care and guidance, preferably in his or her own
home, as will serve the moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community; to preserve and strengthen the minor's family ties
whenever possible, removing him or her from the custody of
his or her parents only when his or her welfare or safety or
the protection of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded without removal; and, when the minor is removed
from his or her own family, to secure for him or her custody,
care and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that
which should be given by his or her parents, and in cases
where it should and can properly be done to place the minor
in a family home so that he or she may become a member of
the family by legal adoption or otherwise. 2
Somewhat more germane to the scope of the court's authority to
enter specific dispositional orders is the provision regarding dispositional hearings, which states in part:
At the dispositional hearing, the court shall determine
whether it is in the best interests of the minor and the public
that he be made a ward of the court, and, if he is to be made
a ward of the court, the court shall determine the proper

STAT. ch. 705, para. 405/1-2 (Smith-Hurd 1993); see also COLO. REv. STAT.
19-1-102 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994) (setting forth legislative intent of Colorado General Assembly in enacting the Children's Code); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.011 (Vernon 1983)
(declaring that the purpose of the Juvenile Courts chapter should be "liberally construed"
so that "each child coming within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court shall receive such
care, guidance and control, preferably in his own home, as will conduce to the child's
welfare and the best interests of the state"); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6301(b)(1) (1982)
(stating that the purpose of the Juvenile Act is "[t]o preserve the unity of the family whenever possible and to provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical
development of children").

22. ILL. ANN.

ANN.
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disposition best serving the interests of the minor and the
public. 3
Second, once the jurisdiction of the court over the child has been
established through the adjudicatory process, the court generally continues to oversee the child's case beyond the hearing at which a dispositional plan for the child is first formally established. Continuing
oversight provides an opportunity for the court to account for
changes in the circumstances of the child or the parents, for evolving
relationships with individuals significant to the child, for new information coming to light, and for deficiencies in a dispositional plan that
become apparent over time, all of which may have an impact on the
continuing efficacy of the original dispositional plan. 4 For children
placed in foster care, the court's responsibility may include not only
oversight of agency decisions, but also direct responsibility for making
certain dispositional decisions even after an agency has been assigned
guardianship of a child.25 Such jurisdiction normally continues until
the child has been satisfactorily returned to the parent or guardian,
an adoption has been finalized, or the child has reached his or her
age of majority. 26 The juvenile court thus carries a continuing and
dynamic responsibility to safeguard the interests of its wards.
23. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 705, para. 405/2-22(1) (Smith-Hurd 1993); see also CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 362(a) (West 1984 & Supp. 1994) (authorizing courts to "make any and all
reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support"
of a child); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. 19-3-507 (West Supp. 1994) (describing court's authority to determine disposition serving best interests of minor); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 4036 (West 1992) (providing that the court should "[pirotect the child from jeopardy"
and act "in the best interests of the child" in determining the disposition of a child's
custody).
24. The federal statutory scheme governing state child welfare systems, the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, directs states to establish a case review system
governing every child in substitute care covered by the Act. The case review system must
provide for each case to be reviewed by a court or an administrative agency at least once
every six months to determine the continuing necessity for the placement, 42 U.S.C.
§ 675(5) (B), and for a court or court-appointed body to conduct a searching dispositional
review no later than eighteen months after an initial placement to ensure the development
and execution of an appropriate permanent plan for the child. Id. § 675(5) (C); see also
Radcliffe, supra note 19, at 189 ("The dispositional plan should never be considered frozen.... At the dispositional hearing, the court works out the best plan according to what
is known and available at the time. However, the knowledge may be imperfect or incomplete; deficiencies will develop as the casework proceeds. The child changes; such is the
very basis for the juvenile court.").
25. In Cook County, Illinois, for example, all critical decisions regarding parent-child
visitation-including whether or not visitation must be supervised by a third party-must
be approved by the juvenile court.
26. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. 19-3-205 (West 1988) (authorizing jurisdiction of
juvenile court until child reaches age 21); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 705, para. 405/2-31 (SmithHurd 1994) (establishing that duration of wardship and discharge of proceedings automat-
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Third, and most critical to the delineation of shared responsibilities, are provisions describing the power of the court, as among its
dispositional options, to appoint a child welfare agency as the legal
custodian of a dependent child. Occasionally, statutory provisions
specifically address the scope of the court's authority over an administrative child welfare agency. Such provisions may either expressly
limit judicial oversight of discretionary agency decisions,27 or expressly authorize judicial direction of agency decisions. 28 More typiically shall last until child reaches age 19, and until child reaches age 21 "for good cause");
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.363 (West 1987) (providing for the revision of dispositional orders).
27. In Illinois, several recent amendments to the Juvenile Court Act have constrained
judicial discretion regarding the selection of a placement, the provision of services, and the
selection of a permanency goal. With respect to placements, the Act now provides that
"[t] he juvenile court may only enter orders placing a minor with a specific foster parent
under this subsection [authorizing intervention and placement requests by current or former foster parents] ... and nothing in this Section shall be construed to confer any jurisdiction or authority on the juvenile court to issue any other orders requiring the appointed
guardian or custodian of a minor to place the minor in a designated foster home or facility." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 705, para. 405/1-5 (2) (b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994). With regard
to services, the Act limits the court's authority to order the provision of specific services or
service providers:
The court also shall enter any other orders necessary to fulfill the service plan,
including, but not limited to, (i) orders requiring parties to cooperate with services, (ii) restraining orders controlling the conduct of any party likely to frustrate
the achievement of the goal, and (iii) visiting orders. Unless otherwise specifically authorized by law, the court is not empowered under this subsection (3) to
order specific services or service providers to be included in the plan. If the court
concludes that the service plan is not a reasonable exercise of discretion by the
Department of Children and Family Services, the court shall remand the matter
to that Department for further consideration of the service plan in light of the
court's findings.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 705, para. 405/2-23(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994). Similarly, amendments to the section of the Act governing permanency planning limit the court's authority
to remand for additional hearings or the selection of a new goal, or both, when the court
believes the agency's choice constitutes an abuse of discretion. Id. ch. 705, para. 405/228(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); see also In re C.D.P., 315 N.W.2d 731, 733 (Iowa 1982)
(applying amended statute that permitted court to prescribe the "type of placement," but
not to direct a specific placement).
28. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-20(f) (1994) (providing that actual physical placement pursuant to a shelter-care hearing for a child alleged to be deprived "shall require
the approval of the judge of the juvenile court or his or her designee"); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 43-285(2) (1993) ("Following an adjudication hearing at which a juvenile is adjudged to
be... [abused or neglected], the court may order the department to prepare and file with
the court a proposed plan for the care, placement, and services which are to be provided
to such juvenile and his or her family....
The court may modify the plan, order that an
alternative plan be developed, or implement another plan that is in the juvenile's best
interests."); In reW., 562 N.Y.S.2d 151, 152 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (applying N.Y. FAM. CT.
AcT § 1017 (Consol. 1993), which provides that "[the court in its discretion may direct
that such commissioner have the child reside in a specific certified foster home where the
court determines that such placement is in furtherance of the child's best interests"), appeal denied, 577 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y. 1991).
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cally, however, statutory schemes simply authorize the assignment of
legal responsibility for a child to the child welfare agency.2 9 Even
where statutes expressly vest in the agency the right to make initial
placement or other dispositional decisions, they generally do not address the scope of the court's authority to limit agency discretion on
placement or other dispositional matters.30 Moreover, statutes typically require some level of continuing judicial oversight of agency decisions, which may encompass approval of specific placement plans.3 1
In sum,juvenile courts are statutorily responsible not only for initially assigning a legal guardian for a child in need of substitute care,
but also for the continuing supervision and monitoring of the child,
consistent with the child's best interests. Thus, while an agency assigned legal guardianship normally is responsible for making at least
an initial placement decision, the juvenile court at a minimum carries
responsibility for approving a dispositional plan and for continuing
oversight of children assigned to the agency's legal custody. It is this
continuing and overlapping responsibility ofjuvenile courts and child
welfare agencies that, more than anything, sets their relationship
apart from other more traditional court/agency relationships.

29. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.2(b) (West Supp. 1994) ("When the court
orders removal ....
the court shall order the care, custody, control, and conduct of the
minor to be under the supervision of the probation officer who may place the minor...

[w]ith a foster family agency.... .");

MINN. STAT. ANN.

§ 260.191, subd. 1(a) (West 1992)

("If the court finds that the child is... neglected .... it shall enter an order making any of
the following dispositions of the case: . . . (2) transfer legal custody to . . . (i) a child
placing agency. . . ."); NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-284 (1993) ("[T]he court ... may make an
order committing... [a juvenile adjudged neglected, dependent or abused] to the... (5)
care and custody of the Department of Social Services.").
30. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-115(3)(a) (West Supp. 1994) (authorizing
courts to give legal custody to an agency that shall have the right to determine "where and
with whom the child shall live"); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-3(12) (1994) (indicating that "legal
custody" includes "[t]he right to determine where and with whom" the child shall live);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-1-4(N) (Michie Supp. 1993) (allowing child found abused or neglected to be placed in the legal custody of an agency, with legal custody including the
"right to determine where and with whom a child shall live"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 1116(B) (West Supp. 1994) ("[W]here the court commits the child to the Department, it
shall vest the Department with authority to place the child . . . ."); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 419B.337 (Supp. 1994) (providing that if the court places a child under legal custody of
the agency for "care, placement and supervision," then the court "may specify the particular type of care, supervision, or services," but actual planning and provision of care remains
the responsibility of the agency).
31. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 705, para. 405/2-28 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (providing for
periodic court review).
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COURT AGAINST AGENCY

In states where legislative direction is broad and ambiguous, 32 reviewing courts lack uniformity in their treatment of the juvenile
court/child welfare agency relationship. 3 Despite this variability,
opinions can be grouped generally into two categories, following dichotomous approaches loosely labeled as 'judicial deference" and 'judicial intervention." While each of these categories encompasses a
significant range of views as to the appropriate scope and timing of
judicial oversight of agency decisions, slightly more than half of the
court opinions surveyed by this Article favor the view of judicial
deference.
A. Judicial Deference
Typically, opinions favoring the view of judicial deference invoke
traditional principles of administrative law encouraging reliance on
agency fact-finding, expertise, and initial decision-making, and minimize the peculiarities of ajuvenile court that distinguish it from a typical court sitting in review of agency action. The case of In re B.L.J.,3 4
decided by the Alaska Supreme Court, represents a good example of
the traditional mode of administrative law analysis applied to a juvenile setting. In B.L.J, three siblings were placed, following an adjudicatory hearing, under the legal custody of the Alaska Department of
Health and Social Services after the trial court entered a finding that
the stepfather had beaten one of the children.3 5 However, while assigning legal responsibility to the agency, the trial court's initial order
directed that physical custody remain with the children's mother and
stepfather, subject to limitations on unsupervised contact between the
abusive stepfather and the children. 6
When the children's caretakers subsequently failed to comply
with the requirements of a treatment plan, the agency caseworker became concerned with their placement and recommended that they be
moved to live with their father until the provisions of the plan were
satisfied.3 7 Because it had been granted "legal custody," the agency
32. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
33. Where a legislative scheme adequately explains the outcome of a case, the core
issues regarding the optimal division of administrative and judicial responsibilities, though
addressed in a legislative rather than ajudicial forum, remain the same. See supra notes 2728 and accompanying text.
34. 717 P.2d 376 (Ala. 1986).
35. Id. at 377.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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sought to invoke its right to determine the appropriate placement for
the children, notwithstanding the court's order specifying where the
children should reside.3 8 To support its claim, the agency relied upon
the statutory provision delineating its rights as a legal custodian, which
provided in part that legal custody encompasses "the responsibility of
physical care and control of the child, the determinationof where and with
whom the child shall live, the right and duty to protect, train and discipline the child, and the duty of providing the child with food, shelter,
education, and medical care." 9 Believing such a change of placement to be unwarranted, the judge of the juvenile court refused to
grant the agency permission to change the placement, affirming his
earlier order leaving physical custody with the children's mother and
stepfather.40
The agency appealed the order to the Alaska Supreme Court. At
the outset of its opinion, that court noted that the trial judge's bifurcation of legal and physical custodial responsibilities did not conform
with the statutory provisions allowing the trial court to award custody
to either the agency4 ' or the child's parents.4 2 Determining first that
the order in question should be treated as an assignment of custody to
the agency rather than to the children's mother and stepfather,4 3 the
Alaska Supreme Court then invoked traditional principles of administrative law to conclude that the agency's power to make placement
decisions was not intended to be shared with the judiciary:
The court can only substitute its judgment for that of the
agency when the agency's decision involves a question of law
which is not within the agency's expertise.
The legislature has committed placement decisions to the
Department's discretion. The various statutory provisions indicate that the Department, not the court, has expertise on
the availability and suitability of placements for minors in its
legal custody.4 4
Though the principles of law at work in this decision remain unlabeled, they are readily identifiable as among the core principles on
which administrative gatekeeping doctrines, such as the doctrines of
exhaustion and primary jurisdiction, are grounded. The notions of
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 378-79.
Id. at 379 (quoting ALAsKA STAT. 47.10.084(a) (Supp. 1994)) (emphasis added)).
Id. at 378.
AiLAsKA STAT. § 47.10.080(c)(1) (Supp. 1994).
Id. § 47.10.080(c) (2).
B.L.J., 717 P.2d at 378 n.1.
Id. at 380 (citation omitted).
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deference to agency expertise and preservation of administrative autonomy are central principles in a long line of cases defining judicial
oversight authority in this area. a5
Other courts have relied on related principles of public law derived more clearly from separation of powers doctrine. In O'Bryan v.
Eighth JudicialDistrict Court,46 the Nevada Supreme Court reached essentially the same conclusion as the court in B.L.J., invoking a somewhat different rationale to support the result. In O'Bryan, the minor
was a sixteen-year-old neglected girl who suffered from severe depression, substance abuse, and antisocial behavior.4 7 After several attempts to treat her at public mental health institutions failed, the
judge of the juvenile court assigned legal custody of the child to a
state mental health agency and ordered her to be placed in an out-ofstate residential facility.4" The agency objected to the order, which
expressly directed it to make payments supporting an expensive placement.49 In reversing the trial court's order, the Nevada Supreme
Court concluded that the juvenile court, upon assigning custody to
the responsible agency, lost jurisdiction under applicable statutes to
substitute its judgment as to the most appropriate placement. 50 The
opinion's obeisance to the separation of powers doctrine is clear:
Although the juvenile division of the district court possesses
independent authority to directly place minors in an out-ofstate facility, once the court grants custody of the child to the
Division, the court loses jurisdiction to substitute its determinations, appraisals and conclusions for those of the Division.
In Galloway v. Truesdall, this Court said: "The courts must be
45. See, e.g., Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 305 (1973) (determining
that prior adjudication by federal agency "familiar with the customs and practices of the
industry" would be a "material aid" in deciding whether applicable law allowed antitrust
suit over revocation of a seat on the defendant's exchange); United States v. Western Pac.
RIR., 352 U.S. 59, 70 (1956) (holding that Interstate Commerce Commission had primary
jurisdiction to consider which of two tariff schedules should be applied to rail shipment of
incendiary devices); Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 576 (1952) (ruling
that court could not exercise jurisdiction over dispute regarding steamship rate systems
without prior submission of the question to the Federal Maritime Board); Order of Ry.
Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561, 567 (1946) (holding, in a labor dispute between two
competing unions and railroad, that if the factual question presented was "intricate and
technical" and an "[a ] gency especially competent and specifically designated to deal with it
has been created by Congress," then the court "should exercise equitable discretion to give
that agency the first opportunity to pass on the issue").
46. 594 P.2d 739 (Nev. 1979).
47. Id. at 740.
48. Id
49. Id.
50. Id.
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wary not to tread upon the prerogatives of other departments of government or to assume or utilize any undue powers. If this is not done, the balance of powers will be
disturbed and that cannot be tolerated for the strength of
our system of government
and the judiciary itself is based
51
upon that theory."

While decisions favoring judicial restraint most commonly rest on
concerns of administrative autonomy and deference to agency exper52
tise, courts also have struck the related theme of judicial efficiency.
One such example is the opinion in In re Danielle W.5 In that case,
the agency responsible for several children in foster care restricted
visitation between the children and their mother. The mother then
challenged the court's order allowing visitation to occur at the discre54
tion of the agency as an improper abdication of judicial authority.
While the bulk of the court's opinion was devoted to a discussion of
the limits of the separation of powers doctrine, the court ultimately
concluded that the delegation of some quasi-adjudicatory powers to
the executive branch was compelled by the "interests of judicial
economy."'55
Judicial restraint, in its most extreme form, completely insulates
agency placement decisions from judicial review. Under this view, a
court's authority to respond when it disapproves of the agency's management of the child's case is limited to removing the child from the
legal guardianship of the agency and entering an alternative dispositional order.5 6 Indeed, at least one court has suggested that when an
agency is assigned permanent custody of a child, even the court's authority to keep abreast of the child's development may be
circumscribed:
When the department is granted permanent custody of a
child, it has virtually free rein to place that child in a foster
51. Id. at 741 (citations omitted).
52. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194-95 (1969) (indicating that "practical
notions of judicial efficiency" are fundamental to the doctrine of exhaustion); see also 4
KENNETh C. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TRFATISE § 26.1, at 415 (2d ed. 1983) (including
"conservation ofjudicial energy by avoiding piecemeal or interlocutory review" as a fundamental basis for deferring to administrative agencies).
53. 255 Cal. Rptr. 344 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).

54. Id. at 345.
55. Id. at 350.
56. See, e.g., In reG.B., 418 N.W.2d 258, 260 (Neb. 1988) ("[I]f the juvenile court finds
that the placement selected by the department is not in a child's best interests and that
some other placement would better serve those interests, the court is free to remove the
child from the custody of the department and place the child wherever the court concludes best meets the child's needs.").

1995]

JUVENILE COURTS AND CHILD WELFARE AGENCIES

395

home of its own choosing, to decree whether, how much,
and what sort of family visitation there should be, and to decide whether to have the child adopted. This discretion is
subject only to a petition for review which cannot be filed
more than once every six months.5 7
Juvenile courts lacking the authority to direct an agency to place
a child in a specific location may nevertheless exercise some degree of
oversight of agency placement decisions. The level of this oversight
may range from the authority to dictate a type of placement to the
more limited power of accepting or rejecting an agency's choice of
placement. An example of the former reasoning is In re C.D.P.,5 s a
case involving a challenge by the agency to a court order directing it
to place a youth in a specific residential facility.59 While holding that
the juvenile court could not specify a placement, the Iowa Supreme
Court concluded that the juvenile court could have indicated what
sort of placement-such as a private foster home, custodial home, or
residential facility-was appropriate, or even could have held that the
boy's best interests demanded placement in a facility meeting the general description of a specific placement.6"
The Vermont Supreme Court's decision in In re G.F6 1 exemplifies the more restrictive view of judicial authority that recognizes a
limited power in the juvenile court to accept or reject a specific placement, but does not grant the greater power to describe the general
parameters of a desired placement.6 2 The court in G.F considered a
statute that assigned to the designated legal custodian the right to determine "where and with whom a juvenile should live,"6" concluding
that this language indicated a legislative intent to create within the
agency a protected realm of discretion.6 4 The juvenile court's author57. Care & Protection of Three Minors, 467 N.E.2d 851, 861 (Mass. 1984).
58. 315 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa 1982).
59. Id. at 732.
60. Id. at 733. Other courts holding that responsible agencies may not be ordered to
place children in a specific location simply have construed trial court language directing
such placements as exhortatory. See, e.g., In re Cynthia A., 514 A.2d 360, 366 (Conn. App.
Ct. 1986) ("The trial court's placement of the child with the paternal grandmother was, in
legal effect, a suggestion to the ... [agency]."); In re R.L.M., 321 S.E.2d 435, 437 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1984) (holding that juvenile court restrictions on placement of child committed to
the custody of agency were not binding); In re Smith, 811 P.2d 145, 146-47 (Or. Ct. App.
1990) (holding that court was not authorized to order agency repeatedly to change placement until agency got "the right one").
61. 455 A.2d 805 (Vt. 1982).
62. Id. at 810.
63. Id. at 809 (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 632(a)(10) (recodified at tit. 33,
§ 5502(a) (10) (1990))).
64. Id.
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ity was likened to that of a highway commission, which may pass on a
recommendation but has "no authority to lay out an alternate
route."6 5
Whether cast in terms of a legislatively mandated division of responsibility, or in terms of limited deference, opinions that adopt the
judicial restraint model66 describe several fundamental concerns: (1)
preserving the legislatively endowed autonomy of child welfare agencies; (2) respecting the agency's experience and expertise, particularly
with respect to fact finding; and (3) limiting the inefficiencies inherent in two overlapping and potentially duplicative review processes.
B. Judicial Intervention
The view favoring more active judicial oversight of agency decisions typically rests upon a vision of a court with broad powers and
responsibilities derived from an expansive legislative grant of authority to the juvenile court. In the context of placement changes, the
decision of the California Court of Appeal in In re Robert A.6 7 represents one of the most searching explorations of the relationship between juvenile courts and administrative agencies following this view.
Upon removal from their parents' home, four siblings, including
Robert A., were placed in the home of a friend of their parents.6" At
the dispositional hearing, the court received a social study recommending that the children remain with the family friend and, with
agreement from the parties, placed all four children under the legal
guardianship of the child welfare agency.69 While no party sought to
move the children, the agency nevertheless requested that the court
enter a general rather than a specific placement order, based on its
contention that the court lacked authority to mandate a specific placement. 70 In support of this request, the agency relied upon the section
65. Id. at 810.
66. See In re K.A.B., 483 So.2d 898, 899 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 1986) ("It is up to the courts,

both trial and appellate, to adjudicate legal rights and responsibilities, it is not within their
province to manage the affairs of another branch of government."); In re Eaton, 757 P.2d
961, 965 (Wash. 1988) (en banc) (holding that juvenile court lacked authority under the
applicable statute to order a minor under the custody of the agency into a particular residential placement); cf.In reJ.M.W., 411 A.2d 345, 349 (D.C. 1980) ("To allow the judiciary
to revoke parole [of a juvenile delinquent] without regard to assessment of those who
retain custody would... permit an impermissible encroachment upon the province of the
executive.").
67. 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
68. Id. at 441.
69. Id.

70. Id. at 443.
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of the California code describing its placement authority7 ' and upon a
court rule. 72 The court obliged the request, 73 and again affirmed the
agency's position at a subsequent hearing on a petition by the children's attorney for clarification of her right to notice prior to a placement change.7 ' The children then appealed, arguing that they were
entitled to a specific placement order that would protect them against
a change in placement without court approval.75
The Court of Appeal, reversing the lower court's decision, relied
upon several sections of the statutory scheme describing broad judicial powers. 76 The cited provisions of law respectively enable a juvenile judge to "make any and all reasonable orders for the care,
supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support" of dependent minors;77 ensure that children who are in need of protective
services "receive care, treatment and guidance consistent with their
best interest and the best interest of the public"; 78 and direct that provisions of the statute be construed liberally.7 9 The court also emphasized the subordinate role of the agency as a "special arm of the
court," upon which the court could choose, but was not bound, to
80
rely.
71. CAL.WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.2(b) (West Supp. 1994) provides:
When the court orders removal pursuant to Section 361, the court shall order the
care, custody, control, and conduct of the minor to be under the supervision of
the probation officer who may place the minor in any of the following:
(1) The home of a relative, including a noncustodial parent.
(2) A foster home in which the child has been placed before an interruption
in foster care, if that placement is in the best interest of the child and space is
available.
(3) A suitable licensed community care facility.
(4) With a foster family agency to be placed in a suitable licensed foster family home or certified family home which has been certified by the agency as
meeting licensing standards.
(5) A home or facility in accordance with federal Indian Child Welfare Act.
The court in Robert A. noted that the reference in this section to "Probation Officer" applies equally under the statute to the actual child welfare agency. Robert A., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 442 n.6.
72. CAL. Civ. & CiuM. RuLs, Rule 1456(a), provides in part that "[a]t the disposition
hearing, the court may: . .. (5) Declare dependency, remove physical custody from the
parent or guardian, and ... (C) Make a general placement order."

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Robert A., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441.
Id. at 441-42.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 443-45.
Id. at 444 (citing CAL.WELF. & INST. CODE § 362(a)).
Id. at 444-45 (citing CAL.WELF. & INST. CODE § 202(b)).
79. Id. at 444 (citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202(a)).
80. Id at 445.
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Most troubling to the Court of Appeal was the deletion of a provision from the applicable legislation which had expressly allowed the
juvenile court to make a direct, specific placement order.8 1 Conceding that the legislature must have intended to change the law by this
deletion, the court nevertheless concluded that this change was meant
simply to clarify the court's authority to delegate the direct supervision of dependent minors to the Department, and was not meant to
"remove the general supervisory power of the juvenile court over the
performance of the specified duties by the court's 'arm', the
Department. "82
The Court of Appeal explained its understanding of the relationship between the juvenile court and the agency:
[T] he Department has a "hybrid responsibility" of representing the state in seeking the best interests of the child, while
simultaneously administering the court's orders, "subject to
the supervision of the juvenile court which provides the parent with the required due process." At the dispositional
hearing, the juvenile court is required.., to have the assistance of the probation officer's social study and recommendations in making an appropriate disposition of the minor.
However, the ultimate decision on disposition is made by the
court, in the performance of its duties . . . to ensure that
dependent minors "shall receive care, treatment and guidance consistent with their best interest." . . . [T]he court
also must provide for the protection and safety of dependent
minors, and seek to preserve and strengthen the minor's
family ties whenever possible. Its order ... placing the custody of the minor under the supervision of the probation
officer remains subject to the continuing duties of the juvenile court to ensure that the activities carried out by its "arm"
are consistent with the mission of the juvenile court as a
83
whole.
Based on this understanding, the appellate court concluded that it
was within the province of the juvenile court to instruct the agency to
place a particular child in a particular home. 4
Though Robert A. may constitute the most comprehensive treatment of this issue, other courts have followed similar reasoning in
reaching the same result. For example, in In re Daniel T., 5 an impris81. Id. at 446.

82. Id. at 447.
83. Id. (citations omitted).
84. Id.
85. 544 A.2d 1302 (Me. 1988).
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oned father of a boy in foster care requested a court order requiring
the agency to seek judicial approval before changing the boy's placement in much the same manner as Robert A.'s attorney had sought to
protect her right to participate in decisions affecting the minor's
placement.8 6 The agency objected, contending that a statutory provision requiring it to give advance notice of a placement change if
"practicable" and "not detrimental to the best interests of the child"
described the full extent of its responsibility to the court and the parties.8 7 The Maine Supreme Court bluntly rejected the agency's narrow interpretation of the juvenile court's oversight authority:
These arguments ignore the underlying and ongoing statutory role of the District Court under the Child and Family
Services and Child Protection Act. This comprehensive statutory treatment of children in need of special care does give
the Department extensive power to fulfill its statutory duty to
protect neglected children and, wherever possible, preserve
family life. But it gives the District Court final say on removing a child from its home and placing it with a new custodian
such as the Department.... Clearly, therefore, Department
decisions concerning placement are open to review. 8
From this conclusion, the court affirmed the juvenile court's discretionary authority to impose the limitation contemplated.8 9 While the
Maine Supreme Court was not faced with the question of whether, at a
pre-change hearing, the juvenile court could direct the placement of a
child in a specific home, the court noted the juvenile court's broad
power to impose "other specific conditions governing custody" beyond the options specified by statute. 90 This reliance on the court's
residual authority suggests a willingness to sanction judicial
micromanagement of the agency's actions as necessary to protect the
child.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court employed similar reasoning in a
somewhat different context in In rej.A.,9 1 which considered the scope
of the Juvenile Court's power to procure information regarding children in foster care from the responsible agency. 9 2 At age sixteen, J.A.
was locked out of her father's home because of her involvement with a
86.
before
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 1303. Specifically, the boy's father wanted an opportunity for a court hearing
the agency changed his son's foster care placement. Id.
Id (quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4041(1)(A) (2) (West Supp. 1987)).
Id at 1303-04 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1304.
Id. (quoting ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4036(1)(H)).
406 N.W.2d 372 (Wis. 1987).

92. Id. at 372.
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thirty-two-year-old man.9 3 The agency placed J.A. in a foster home,
but removed her after less than a month when the foster parent indicated J.A. was not following rules.9 4 After the girl ran from a second
foster home, a hearing disclosed that her first foster mother was the
sister of her adult paramour, and that the agency had failed to remove
her from the home after learning of this relationship.9 5
Upon hearing these facts, the presiding juvenile court judge expressed his "displeasure" with the agency's handling of the case 96 and
ordered the agency to furnish the court with certain information
about foster parents and children in the county.9 7 The agency objected, in part on the grounds that the juvenile court lacked the statutory authority to enter the order.9" Among the issues considered by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court on review was whether the statutory
scheme governing both the juvenile court and the responsible child
welfare agency gave the court the power to order the agency to prepare a comprehensive report on foster care placements. 99
In its review of this legislative scheme, the Supreme Court referred to provisions granting the court "exclusive original jurisdiction"
over children in need of protection and supervision; 10 0 authorizing
the court to place children in need in foster care; 10 1 requiring continued supervision of such children by the court; 0 2 allowing the court to
require service providers to make reports;10 3 and permitting the court
to order the child welfare agency "to perform other functions as ordered by the court." 0 4 In rejecting the argument that the scope of
the challenged order exceeded the authority granted by the legislature, the court noted that "[t]he statute contemplates a substantial
role for juvenile courts and judges in implementing the objectives of
the statute."1 0 5 Even beyond these responsibilities, the court recognized an affirmative duty ofjuvenile judges under the statute to make

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 373.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

98. Id.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id. (quoting Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.13 (West 1987)).
Id. (citing Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.34(3)(c), 48.345, & 48.355(1) (West 1987)).
Id. (citing Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.357 (West 1987)).
Id. (citing Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.08(1) (West 1987)).
Id. (citing Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.069(1) (e) (West 1987)).
105. Id. at 375.
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inquiries whenever it seems apparent that the services being offered
are deficient.1 °6
The unifying theme of decisions favoring a more expansive view
of judicial authority recognizes the juvenile court as the entity ultimately responsible for protecting state wards. These decisions, and
others adhering to a similar viewpoint,'O° rely largely on the general
statutory directive to juvenile courts to ensure that the best interests of
the child are safeguarded once cause for state intervention has been
established.
IV.

ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE

In an environment where judicial resources devoted to child welfare cases are scarce, there is considerable merit to the notion that the
role of juvenile court judges should be limited to 'Judging," and
should not include "social work."'
Whatever may be the practical
implications of such a notion, it rests at bottom on a legitimate sentiment that caseworkers generally are better equipped to manage the
details of their cases. In the ideal, caseworkers bring to their work
specialized training, knowledge of available resources, skills in family
assessments and the development of service-based plans for meeting a
family's needs, and understanding of the individual children and families with which they work. Moreover, such deference comports with
the notions of judicial economy and administrative autonomy
grounded in traditional principles of administrative law. 1°9 At a mini106. Id.
107. See, e.g., KB. v. Missouri Div. of Family Servs., 672 S.W.2d 710, 711 (Mo. Ct. App.
1984) (holding that the juvenile court did not exceed its authority in ordering a minor
placed in a specific residential home); In re F.M., 400 A.2d 576, 579 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1979)
(finding that the court was authorized to direct the agency to enroll the child in a special
residential school if found to be in child's best interests); In re Daniel T.C., 532 N.Y.S.2d
474, 479-80 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1988) (holding that the family court had authority to direct a
specific home for placement of a child under agency responsibility).
108. For example, in a special report prepared in the wake of a particularly notorious
child fatality, an independent committee commissioned by the Cook County Circuit Court
to recommend changes to the County's juvenile court system opined that "judges should
be making the kinds of decisions that they are trained to make, and.., social work decisions should be made by social workers." The Report of the Independent Committee to
Inquire into the Practices, Processes and Proceedings in the Juvenile Court as They Relate
to the Joseph Wallace Cases, Oct. 1, 1993, at 72; see also Nathan Glazer, Should Judges Administer Social Services, The Public Interest, Winter 1978, at 64-80 (criticizing judicial involvement in the administration of social services).
109. Professor Davis includes among the main underpinnings of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies the "protection of agency processes from impairment by
avoidable interruption, conservation ofjudicial energy by avoiding piecemeal or interlocutory review, and providing the agency opportunity to correct its own errors." DAvis, supra
note 52, § 26.1, at 415.
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mum, the reasoned and informed social-work judgments of qualified
caseworkers, drawn into question in litigation, should be entitled to
some degree of deference. 110
On the other hand, acceding to the compelling temptation to
apply bright-line rules limiting court review over agency actions can
interfere with the court's ultimate responsibility to safeguard the welfare of its wards. Agencies may be influenced by institutional concerns that compete with the objective of developing an optimal plan
for an individual child. Moreover, caseworkers may make bad decisions, whether out of inexperience, lack of knowledge, prejudice, or
incompetence. Under such circumstances, a judge carrying ultimate
responsibility for protecting the interests of a state ward must be able
to exercise oversight authority and to respond to a situation where it
becomes apparent that the agency is not meeting the needs of the
child or family.
How then can a juvenile court strike an appropriate balance between exercising an appropriate degree of deference and restraint
and its ultimate responsibility as parens patriae? To answer this question, it is necessary first to consider whether constitutional separation
of powers doctrine compels the application of bright-line rules dividing judicial and administrative responsibilities. Second, the practical
obstacles arising from the substantive overlap of administrative and
judicial functions in child welfare must be addressed when implementing any such bright-line rules. The following sections address
these two issues.
A.

Separation of Powers

It is necessary at the outset to consider whether the rigid compartmentalization of functions often engendered by the judicial restraint model is compelled by constitutionally-grounded
considerations of separation of powers. At one extreme, appellate
courts have applied sweeping limitations that amount to complete
bars against court review of certain types of agency action."1 ' Such
decisions, though rarely grounded expressly in constitutional dogma,
are commonly cast in terms of jurisdictional limits on court powers
that clearly implicate separation of powers concerns. These opinions
also typically reflect the view that placement decisions are essentially
110. Goldstein, Freud, Solnit and Goldstein, in the third of three seminal treatises on
the best interests of the child, caution judges against substituting their own lay instincts for
those of experts or professionals in the areas of child development and mental health. See
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., IN THE BEsT INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 21-31

(1986).

111. See supra Part III.A. discussing judicial deference to agency decisions.
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an executive rather than a judicial function, requiring the application
of skills, knowledge, and experience unique to the placing agency.
Several decisions, discussing both limits on the court's jurisdiction or authority and reliance on agency expertise, illustrate this reasoning. In In re K.A.B.," 2 a Florida appellate court reversed an order
of the juvenile court directing the responsible agency to place a child
in a specific residential facility, holding that the order was beyond the
lower court's authority.' 1 3 In upholding the agency's ultimate authority over placement decisions," 4 the court's opinion strikes both
themes:
[I]t is crystal clear that it is within the discretion of the
agency to decide where to keep the child who is in its custody. The agency is, of course, better equipped to make dayt6-day health and welfare decisions which concern the child.
The courts are not given general supervisory power over the
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services under the
statutes.
It is up to the courts, both trial and appellate, to adjudicate legal rights and responsibilities, it is not within their
province to manage the affairs of another branch of
government. 11 5
Decisions adopting the judicial restraint model by describing limitations on the court's 'jurisdiction" or "authority" invoke similar concerns. For example, in State ex rel. Human Services Department,1 6 a New
Mexico appellate court held that the trial court had exceeded its statutory authority in ordering that the child in question remain in placement with her current foster parent." 7 The agency had
contemplated moving the child to live with her adult brother in California, whose home had been favorably recommended in a home
study." 8 Based entirely on the brother's homosexuality, the juvenile
court rejected this placement and ordered the child welfare agency to
leave the child in her current non-relative foster home. 1 9 On revers112. 483 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
113. Id. at 899.
114. On appeal, the court affirmed the lower court order, except for the words directing
placement "at Country Acres." Id.; see also O'Bryan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 594 P.2d
739, 741 (Nev. 1979) (holding that once juvenile court granted custody of the child to the
agency, it lost jurisdiction to substitute its determinations, appraisals, and conclusions for
those of the agency) (discussed supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text).
115. Id. (citations omitted).
116. 764 P.2d 1327 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).
117. Id. at 1328.
118. Id. at 1329.
119. Id.
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ing the order, the appellate court relied upon the statutory definition
of "legal custody," which the court paraphrased as "a legal status created by court order that vests in a person or agency the right to determine where and with whom a child will live." 120 The court concluded
that:
Although the Code authorizes the children's court to order
that legal custody remain with the Department, it does not
grant the court the power to dictate to the Department
where the child should be placed .... Thus, we conclude
that, once legal custody was in the Department, the children's court had no authority to prohibit the Department
from placing
physical custody of the child with any particular
12 1
person.
These decisions, and others like them, 22 reflect the notion that
placement decisions fall squarely within the province of the administrative agency, and that the judiciary should not impose its will on the
agency in the area of placement of agency wards. One measure of the
awkwardness of this rigid division of responsibilities is the frequency
with which arguments grounded in separation of powers concerns
have been made from conflicting perspectives. Though such arguments are made most often by agencies challenging the authority of
the court, 2 1 they also have been made by individuals challenging
agency decisions regarding services as a usurpation of judicial authority. For example, in In re G.B.,' 2 4 the agency objected to an order of
the court directing it to place a child in a specific treatment center
and pay for the costs of care. The agency relied upon a statute granting it the authority to "determine the care, placement .... and expenditures" of children committed to its care. 125 In response, the
minor, supporting the court's order, argued that the statute " 'contradicts the very nature of the reasoning behind the separation of pow120. Id. (paraphrasing N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 32-1-3(J) (Michie. Cum. Supp. 1988) (recodifled at § 32A-1-4(N) (Michie Supp. 1993))).
121. Id. (citations omitted).
122. See, e.g., In re C.D.P., 315 N.W.2d 731, 733 (Iowa 1982) (holding that the juvenile
court did not have the authority to direct a specific placement); In re G.B., 418 N.W.2d 258,
260 (Neb. 1988) (holding that once a court commits a child to an administrative agency,
the agency has the "sole authority" to select the care and placement for the child); In re
Eaton, 757 P.2d 961, 965 (Wash 1988) (en banc) ("We hold that the juvenile court does
not have the authority to select the placement facility. .. ").
123. In addition to the cases discussed supraPart III.A. see, for example, City & County
of Denver v. Juvenile Court, 511 P.2d 898, 901 (Colo. 1973) (discussing a petition filed by
the city and county of Denver and its Department of Welfare against the juvenile court).
124. 418 N.W.2d 258 (Neb. 1988).
125. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-284 (1988).
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ers,'" and urged that "'it would be ludicrous to think that the juvenile
Court would have to abide by a decision of the Nebraska Department
of Social Services regarding the care of a child, even if the Court knew
that such care was not in the best interest of that child."'1 2 6 In In re
Danielle W., 12 7 a mother who objected to a decision by the agency re-

1 28
stricting her visitation with her daughters raised a similar challenge.
Seeking to block the agency's decision regarding visitation, the
mother argued that the court's willingness to allow the agency to define the parameters of visitation constituted an improper delegation
129
of judicial authority in violation of separation of powers doctrine.
The facility with which litigants have raised separation of powers
arguments from both sides of the fence suggests the difficulty inherent in defining particular decision-making functions in child welfare
as either inherently judicial or inherently administrative. More fundamentally, these arguments reflect a narrow view of separation of powers doctrine that is inconsonant with the complex relationship
between a juvenile court and a state agency responsible for supervising a dependent or neglected child. This relationship is marked by an
interdependence that derives chiefly from the juvenile court's oversight responsibility and is uncharacteristic of traditional relations between administrative agencies and reviewing courts, where the judicial
function is normally limited to reviewing agency action. While the
relationship may fairly be analyzed in terms of separation of powers
doctrine, the analysis nevertheless must recognize the need to balance
the agency's presumed superior expertise against the court's oversight
responsibility. This balancing will call for varying degrees of deference, depending on the circumstances of the individual case. It follows that the best interests of the child will, at times, require the court
to exercise certain functions normally lodged with the agency.
The flexibility called for by this balancing has been recognized as
a legitimate factor in defining the constitutionally imposed boundaries of judicial and executive/administrative authority. In one of the
more thoughtful discussions of the application of separation of powers doctrine to the field of child welfare, the California Court of Appeal described the juvenile court's necessary dependence on the

126. In re G.B., 418 N.W.2d at 260 (quoting Brief of Appellee at 9). The court on review
rejected this argument and sustained the agency's argument that the trial court order exceeded its authority. Id. at 261.

127. 255 Cal. Rptr. 344 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
128. Id. at 348.
129. Id. The court rejected this argument. Id, at 350; cf. Commodity Futures Trading

Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (rejecting separation of powers challenge to delegation of authority to the CFrC to hear common-law counterclaims).
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information provided to it by agency personnel in dependency proceedings, but at the same time recognized the court's ultimate responsibility to its wards.' 3 1 First, the court acknowledged the need for
judicial restraint, grounded in the wisdom of deference to agency
expertise:
The Supreme Court has recognized that the probation officers who prepare social studies for use at disposition in dependency proceedings are "disinterested parties" who
prepare such reports "in the regular course of their professional duties." These reports accordingly have the characteristics of objectivity and expertise, which lend them a degree
of reliability and trustworthiness ....

[A] probation officer

becomes a "special arm of the court" to investigate the status
of the children and report. Obviously, the juvenile court is
entitled to rely on the expertise and the recommendations of
the probation officer in making its dispositional determinations. It should also be wary of substituting its own professional judgment for that of workers experienced in the
field. 131
Yet the court also recognized the complexity of the relationship between court and agency and the need for this complexity to translate
into a flexible interpretation of the boundaries of each institution's
authority:
The relationship of the juvenile court and its assisting "arm,"
the Department, is correctly analyzed in terms of the constitutional separation of powers. 'Judicial power is in the
courts and their function is to declare the law and determine
the rights of parties to a controversy before the court. Executive or administrative officers cannot exercise or interfere
with judicial powers." However, such separation of powers
need not and cannot be absolute. "The correct principle deducible from the better-reasoned cases dealing with the separation of powers seem[s] to be that even the primary
function of any of the three departments may be exercised
by any other governmental department or agency so long as
(1) the exercise thereof is incidental or subsidiary to a function or power otherwise properly exercised by such department or agency, and (2) the department to which the
function so exercised is primary retains some sort of ultimate

130. In re Robert A., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438, 443-48 (1992).
131. Id. at 445 (citations omitted).
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control over its exercise, as by court review in the case of the
exercise of a power judicial in nature." 3
As the court in In re Robert A. noted, the separation of powers
doctrine is not absolute. Rather, it describes a principle of shared
powers, in which the court, though dependent on the agency in many
133
respects, must exercise ultimate authority to protect its wards.
While the level of interdependency ofjuvenile courts and administrative child welfare agencies distinguishes this relationship from many
traditional court/agency relationships such as are found in the regulatory context, this interdependence is by no means limited to the field
of child welfare. In fact, the Supreme Court, in reflecting on the
evolution of public law, observed that it had "recognized early in the
development of administrative agencies that coordination between
traditional judicial machinery and these agencies was necessary if con134
sistent and coherent policy was to emerge."

132. Id. (citations omitted).
133. See also In reJeffrey S., 663 P.2d 1211, 1218-21 (Okla. 1983) (Simms, V.CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that a court's ultimate responsibility to its
wards must, consistent with separation of powers doctrine, include the power to direct a
state agency that has legal custody over a child); In reJ.A., 406 N.W.2d 372, 376 (Wis. 1987)
(affirming the authority of the juvenile court to order the agency to produce reports to the
court about wards in its care by holding that "[t he statute envisions a cooperative effort
between the court and county social service departments to effectuate its purposes....
Thus, judicial and executive branches share certain power as is contemplated by the separation of powers doctrine."); In re Lawrence M., No. 1-93-3113 et al., 1995 Ill. App. LEXIS
33, at *10 (Jan. 20, 1995) (holding that court order directing agency to enroll mother in
specific inpatient drug treatment program simply mandated compliance with agency's statutory responsibilities and did not violate separation of powers doctrine). These decisions
reflect the same functional approach to the separation of powers doctrine, stressing the
interdependence of the three branches and the practical necessities of governance, that
has dominated the Supreme Court's treatment of federal separation of powers issues tracing back to the birth of the modern administrative state. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding validity of United States Sentencing Commission); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding provisions of the Ethics in Government Act
authorizing the appointment of an independent counsel); Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n, 478 U.S. at 833 (upholding statute granting CFTC jurisdiction over common-law
counterclaims); Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980)
(upholding broad delegation of authority to OSHA); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414
(1944) (upholding assignment of statutory authority to administrative agency to impose
criminal penalties for violations of the Emergency Price Control Act). For a general discussion of the dominance of functionalist over formalist analysis in the Supreme Court's separation of powers jurisprudence, see Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional Improprieties:
Reflections on Mistretta, Morrison, and Administrative Government, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 357
(1990); Thomas W. Merrill, The ConstitutionalPrincipleof Separation of Powers, 1991 Sup. CT.
REv. 225, 226.
134. Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S.
62, 68 (1970).
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Overlap Between Judicial and Administrative Functions

If the application of bright-line rules cannot be justified as a reasonable derivative of separation of powers doctrine, neither can it be
said that such rules offer a workable practical solution to the problem
of turf wars between courts and child welfare agencies. The Supreme
Court's observation in Port of Boston, noted above, reflects what Professor Christopher Edley labels as the "boundary problem," which he describes as a major conceptual failing of the decision-making
paradigms on which the public law doctrines dividing judicial and executive responsibilities are based.'1 5 "Although [these] paradigms are
arguably distinct in the abstract, in practice they are commingled and
inseparable except when subjected to artificial and distorted conceptual violence .... Where one paradigm ends and another
begins is a
" 13 6
matter of arbitrary perception or skillful advocacy.
Professor Edley's comment seems especially germane in the context of shared decision-making in the field of child welfare, where
rigid definitions of certain types of decisions as peculiarly "administrative" or 'judicial" seem particularly awkward, and where the practical
difficulties posed by the task of distinguishing judicial and administrative functions are especially troublesome." 7 Under a typical legislative scheme governing abuse, neglect, and dependency cases, judges
are charged with a variety of responsibilities that include determining
whether to remove a child from a parent, whether a temporary or
permanent legal guardian for a child should be appointed and if so,
whom to appoint, whether a particular long-term goal is in the child's
135. Christopher Edley, Jr., The Governance Crisis, Legal Theory, and PoliticalIdeology, 1991
DuKE L.J. 561. Professor Edley describes a trichotomy of decision-making paradigms derived from the separation of powers ethos of public law which, he argues, "provide the
framework for much judicial analysis of where the mood for review of an administrative
action should be located along a spectrum that ranges from extreme deference to aggressive interventionism." Id. at 568. The paradigms consist of (1) adjudicatoryfairness, with
emphasis on established rules and consistency of process and application such as occurs in
an appellate court; (2) science, with emphasis on a rational, objective and impersonal process of fact-finding; and (3) politics,with emphasis on personal values and partisan politics.
Id. at 568-69.
136. Id. at 570-71.
137. See Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Clark, 802 S.W.2d 461, 463-64 (Ark. 1991)
(describing aspects of responsibility to provide family services borne by both court and
agency). The role of the administrative agency itself encompasses functional aspects of all
three branches of government. Thus, even apart from the difficulties of defining child
welfare decisions in strict separation of powers terms, the place of the administrative
agency within a separation of powers scheme is ambiguous. For a general discussion of the
application of separation of powers doctrine to the administrative agency, see Laurence J.
O'Toole,Jr., Doctrines and Developments: Separation of Powers, the Politics-AdministrationDichotomy, and the Rise of the Administrative State, 47 PUB. ADMIN. Rav. 17 (1987).
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best interests, and whether the efforts of the child welfare agency to
address the family's needs are "reasonable."'
Though resolution of each of these decisions represents a potential judicial function, each calls upon the decision-maker to exercise
knowledge falling more typically within the realm of expertise of the
social worker, mental health professional, or child development expert. For example, judgments about whether or not to remove a child
from a caregiver call upon the decision-maker to weigh the risks to a
child arising from a particular set of circumstances against the potential emotional or psychological harm to the child arising from the removal. Such a decision calls for an assessment of risks that requires
knowledge about the predictive value of specific circumstances of the
case. Moreover, the decision-maker must understand the fundamentals of child development, attachment, separation, and loss. Indeed,
the very nature of the indeterminate legal standard governing child
welfare cases-the "best interests of the child"-not only permits, but

even compels judges to rely upon knowledge of human circumstance
and experience falling more commonly within the ambit of other professional disciplines.
In the modern urban juvenile court, the notion that the generalized nature of a judge's experience compels deference to the more
specialized experience of an agency caseworker may fairly be called
into question. Even in relatively small urban jurisdictions, the management of a juvenile caseload may command the full-time resources
of one or more judges.' 39 With such focused experience, a judge is
likely to become well versed in the types of problems faced by families,
the available community resources, and the indicators that define the
likely success or failure of a particular course of action. While such
experience is no substitute for professional training in a non-legal discipline, it nevertheless militates against constraining judicial authority
on the grounds that social workers are invariably better qualified to
make certain types of dispositional decisions. If a judge is intimately
familiar with the placement alternatives and resources available to
state wards in a particular locale, or if a case presents circumstances
138. See, e.g., IL. ANN. STAT. ch. 705, paras. 405/2-10, 2-23, 2-28 (Smith-Hurd 1992 &
Supp. 1994).
139. In Cook County, Illinois, for example, as of February 1995, 16 judges and 23 hearings officers devote full time to hearing neglect, abuse and dependency cases. In Hamilton
County, Ohio, which encompasses the Cincinnati metropolitan area and has a population
of less than one-fifth that of Cook County, the equivalent of 3.5 full-time referee positions
are devoted exclusively to hearing these cases. See MARK HARDIN, AM. BAR Ass'N, JUDICIAL
IMPLEMENTATION OF PERMANENCY PLANNING REFORM:

(1992).

ONE COURT THAT WoRKs

14, 21
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that are sufficiently unique to render the agency's prior experience
largely inapplicable, or if the outcome of a decision will turn solely on
expert testimony that ajudge is well qualified to assess, there might be
comparatively less cause to defer a dispute over the child's placement
to the agency's remedial processes. Goldstein notes that a functioning
child welfare system will regularly require the crossing of somewhat
artificial professional borders:
The effectiveness of participation by persons of different disciplines in the child placement process depends on their
learning from one another. A workable child placement
process will provide for a conscious, restrained, open and reviewable use by professional participants of knowledge acquired from a discipline not their own. The art of
collaboration grows out of a recognition that borders do exist, even if they cannot always be sharply defined, and that
under certain circumstances they may be crossed.14 °
This discussion suggests that the rigid compartmentalization of
judicial and administrative functions in the child welfare context not
only is not compelled by constitutional doctrine, but may also engender significant problems as applied to a field that is replete with overlapping responsibilities. While few states have addressed in detail
issues relating to this division of responsibility, a review of three separate opinions of the Florida appellate courts offers an excellent case
study of the practical difficulties faced by courts attempting to strike a
workable balance between judicial responsibility and agency
discretion.
140. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 110, at 54; see also Edwards, supra note 2, at 16 ("The
social service agency and the juvenile court... cannot do without one another."). In
support of his contention, Goldstein describes a case in which ajudge heard and upheld a
challenge by a foster parent to an agency decision to remove several foster children from
her home. Id. at 56-57 (describing Rivera v. Marcus, 533 F. Supp. 203 (D. Conn.), affd,
696 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1982)). In Rivera, the court, though concluding that the process by
which removal had been effected was constitutionally deficient, nonetheless refrained
from simply ordering the children returned to the claimant's home. Rivera, 533 F. Supp.
at 208-09. Instead, because of the passage of time, the court ordered a hearing to determine whether returning the children to the aggrieved foster parent would be in their best
interests. Id.
Goldstein writes that "[bly agreeing to hold a hearing, the District Court judge
demonstrated that he knew enough about a child's need for continuity of care not to move
these children until he had heard expert testimony on the potential effect of such a move."
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 110, at 56; cf. In reAshley K., 571 N.E.2d 905, 930 (Ill. 1991)
(concluding that child should remain with foster parents pending determination on remand as to her best interests, thus reversing the juvenile court's order, made 20 months
prior to appellate ruling, that child should be returned to her biological parents from
foster care).
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In the 1975 case of Division of Family Services v. Florida,'4 ' the District Court of Appeal of Florida adopted a rule allowing juvenile
courts to exercise substantial control over the state's child welfare
agency, acting in its capacity as legal guardian for dependent children.
In that case, the juvenile court granted legal custody of five siblings to
the agency's Division of Family Services, but conditioned that custody
on the division's placement of all five children in the same foster
home. 4 2 The court later held the agency in contempt when it separated the children into three different homes without first seeking
1 43
court approval.
Relying upon a statutory provision granting it "'the right to determine where and with whom the child shall live,'" 1" the agency challenged the trial court's authority to limit its placement discretion. 45
The appellate court rejected the agency's challenge.' 46 Reading the
statutory provision in the context of broad statutory grants of authority to the juvenile court, the appellate court concluded that the description of the powers of an agency acting as legal custodian
permitted the exercise of agency discretion only in the absence of a
limiting court order:
It clearly was not intended that the agency have unfettered
discretion nor was it intended that the agency be permitted
to flaunt or ignore specific provisions contained in the custodial order. Such interpretation and construction is fortified
by the frequent reference in Chapter 39 to the court, the
provision for the exclusive original jurisdiction in the court
...

and the declared purposes of the chapter ....

117

Despite the clarity of the court's rule in Division of Family Services
v. Florida,the Florida District Court of Appeal took a much more pro141.
142.
143.
144.

319 So. 2d 72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
Id. at 74.
Id.
Id. at 75 (quoting FLA. STAT. ch. 39.01(9) (West 1988)). Oddly, notwithstanding

the more expansive view of agency authority taken by several recent Florida decisions, see
infra notes 149-153 and accompanying text, the current provision of Florida law defining
the powers of a legal custodian no longer references the "right to decide where and with
whom the child shall live," and thus offers an even less persuasive case for protecting the
"unfettered discretion" of the agency. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(29) (West 1988) (defining "legal custody" as "a legal status created by court order ... which vests in a custodian of
the person or guardian, whether an agency or an individual, the right to have physical
custody of the child and the right and duty to protect, train, and discipline him and to
provide him with food, shelter, education, and ordinary medical, dental, psychiatric, and
psychological care").
145. Division of Family Servs., 319 So. 2d at 75.
146. Id. at 77.
147. Id. at 75-76.
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tective view of the agency's discretion in In re KA.B., 4 8 a case construing the identical statutory language at issue in Division of Family
Services. The court in KA.B. held that the juvenile court has no power
to direct specific placements of children under the legal care of the
responsible agency. 149 In upholding the agency's objection to a courtordered placement in a specific home, the court concluded, without
reference to Division of Family Services, that "the agency is, of course,
better equipped to make day-to-day health and welfare decisions
150
which concern the child."
A vigorous dissent in KA.B. echoed the themes sounded in Division of Family Services. In arguing that courts should have the power to
direct placement, the dissenting opinion relied on the juvenile court's
broad responsibilities and continuing jurisdiction, as well as on the
limitations on the state's right to appeal:
The juvenile court has broad statutory and common law authority and responsibility as to the care and custody of any
child it has adjudicated to be dependent. The juvenile court
has the authority to impose reasonable conditions as to the
placement of any such dependent child. The court imposed
condition that the child in this case remains in "Country
Acres" is not challenged as being unreasonable as to this particular child .... When the juvenile court judge determines
that the dependent child, in its best interests, should reside
in a particular suitable place, must the judge place the child
in the temporary legal custody of someone other than [the
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS)] in
order to effectuate its decision without a contest from HRS
asserting its 1independence as a separate branch of
government?15
The divergent approaches taken by the court in these two opinions run squarely into conflict in the 1991 case, State v. Brooke, 52 a
decision illustrating the difficulty of reconciling the roles of a juvenile
court and a child welfare agency responsible for a ward of the court.
Brooke involved consolidated appeals from several identical orders directing the responsible agency to place children under its legal custody and in need of mental health services in "available" therapeutic
placements, as recommended by a court-appointed advisory review
148. 483 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (discussed supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text).
149. Id. at 899.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 899-900.
152. 573 So. 2d 363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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committee. Affirming the orders on appeal, the court recognized and
reiterated the separation of powers concerns that had moved it to defend the agency's basic right to choose an appropriate placement in
K.A.B. Consistent with the decision in K.A.B., 153 it noted that the
challenged orders did not mandate placement in any specific location. The court also noted, however, that the agency's discretion is
not "'unfettered, ' " 5 4 and that the court's obligation to act as the ultimate guarantor of the child's well being imposes limitations on the
exercise of agency discretion.' 55 Therefore, only by construing the
orders narrowly did the court in Brooke affirm them as consistent with
the agency's constitutionally-protected discretionary authority. Focusing on the use of the word "available" in the challenged orders, the
appellate court found that the agency was left with sufficient latitude
not to place the child either if funds were unavailable, or if the agency
could not find a suitable placement meeting the court's
15 6
description.
Consonant with the reasoning of the court in K.A.B., the decision
in Brooke imposes limits only around the outer margins of the agency's
discretion, allowing the agency, for a variety of reasons, to reject the
exhortation of the judge. However, the opinion also opens the door
to judicial imposition of limitations on agency discretion. For example, consistent with Brooke, an agency required to place a child in a
therapeutic residential program, once funds and placement are available, might also be required to utilize a placement proximate to the
child's parents, or consonant with a particular religious agenda. Yet
clearly, as conditions move from the generic to the specific, the efficacy of a rigid rule of law premised on the protection of some vaguely
defined inner core of discretion becomes increasingly suspect. For
example, a judge who believes that a child should be placed in a particular institution might describe the desired "type" of placement with
such specificity-without actually naming the institution-as to make
his intent unmistakable.
Such an action may be cast on review as an artifice, insufficient to
pass constitutional muster under cases such as K.A.B. and Brooke. A
157
case in point is the Oregon appellate court decision of In re Smith.
In that case, the trial judge, having grown increasingly frustrated with
153. Id. at 369.
154. Id. (quoting Division of Family Servs. v. Florida, 319 So. 2d 72, 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1975)).
155. Brooke, 573 So. 2d at 369.
156. Id.
157. 811 P.2d 145 (Or. Ct. App.), review denied, 819 P.2d 731 (Or. 1991).
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the agency's reluctance to place a child with his mother,1 5 suggested
a willingness to reject successive substitute care placements chosen by
The legal context established by previous decisions of
the agency.'
the Oregon Court of Appeals limited judicial authority to direct an
agency to utilize a specific placement, but nevertheless allowed for an
order directing the removal of a child from an unacceptable home.'
Recognizing this limitation on his authority, the trial judge made
it clear that he would reject all other placements for the child until
the agency met his expectations. 16 ' The appellate court viewed this
strategy as an unacceptable end-run around limitations on the trial
court's placement authority:
Frustrated by [Children's Services Division's (CSD)] handling of the case, the court appears to have tried to accomplish indirectly, by use of strong declarations from the
bench, what it could not accomplish directly. After determining that child was in need of protective supervision, the
court said that it would nonetheless terminate both the
court's wardship and CSD's legal custody and return child to
mother, unsupervised, if CSD did not place child with
mother....
A court is not authorized to order changes in16 2CSD's
placement decisions until CSD gets "the right one."
The decisions in Brooke and Smith illustrate the awkwardness of
placing limits on the authority of a judge who still retains ultimate
authority for making dispositional decisions. In practice, the power of
a judge authorized to order a specific placement differs little from
that of a judge -who may only specify the type of placement, but who
may continually remand the case until the agency "gets it right." Indeed, if a court has power only to reject an unsatisfactory placement,
with no concurrent authority to nudge the agency in the right direction, it presumably would just take longer for the agency to reach the
court's desired result.
158. The opinion in In re Smith suggests that, for reasons left unarticulated, the trial
court acknowledged the more conventional route of simply returning legal custody to the
mother, but preferred instead to return physical custody and leave the agency as the legally
responsible guardian. Smith, 811 P.2d at 146.
159. Id. at 147.
160. SeeIn reJ.D., 640 P.2d 660, 662 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) ("[Wlhen the court has granted
custody and guardianship to [the agency,] ... [i]t has the power to recommend [a] placement ... [or to) order [the agency] to remove a child from a poor placement ....
That

does not give it the power to order [a] specific alternative placement.") (citing In re
Shrewsbury, 627 P.2d 910 (Or. Ct. App. 1981)).
161. Smith, 811 P.2d at 146-47.
162. Id.
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Another case in point is the Vermont Supreme Court's decision
in In reJS.163 In that case, the state child welfare agency gained custody of a minor child and initially placed him, without objection from
the minor child, in a recommended foster home.'6 When the agency
later made clear its intent to move the boy into a residential home
that had been plagued by incidents of sexual abuse of younger residents, 165 however, the child took his objections to court. 6 6 The juvenile court initially denied the child's request for review of the agency's
placement decision, limiting him to administrative remedies which
had yet to be exhausted. 6' 7 When a space opened in the home and
the placement change became imminent, the child returned to court
seeking an injunction to bar the move. 6 Receptive to the boy's concerns, the judge of the juvenile court, while denying the injunction,
construed the boy's request as seeking enforcement of the original
dispositional order and barred his removal from the foster home.' 69
The court reasoned that, unless it could exercise continuing review
powers, the agency would be free to propose a case plan at an initial
dispositional hearing, have it rejected, obtain approval of a second
70
case plan, and then return to the original plan with impunity.
The Vermont Supreme Court reversed. Relying on its earlier
opinion in In re G.F.,"7' in which it had held that the juvenile court's
oversight power is limited to accepting or rejecting an initial treatment plan for a child under the agency's custody, the Supreme Court
barred the juvenile court from exercising review over decisions by the
agency to modify an aspect of the original plan7 2 Unpersuaded by
the trial court's logic, the reviewing court found sufficient protection
in the juvenile court's power to set aside an approved dispositional
plan when the original order was obtained by "fraud or mistake." 173
This decision thus effectively limited juvenile court oversight of placement changes to circumstances suggesting a mistake or a manifest intent to defraud the court at the time of the original order, precluding

163. 571 A.2d 658 (Vt. 1989).
164. Id. at 659.
165. Id. at 661.
166. Id. at 660.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 663.
171. 455 A.2d 805 (Vt. 1982).
172. JS., 571 A-2d at 663.
173. Id.
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review of placement changes based on subsequent developments,
even if those changes are contrary to the best interests of the child. 7' 4
The statutory delegation to the courts of ultimate responsibility
for state wards is consonant neither with the limitation on its powers
of review nor with protecting agency decision-making authority from
judicial review. 17 1 It is this broad grant of judicial authority, with its
attendant responsibility, which distinguishes the court's responsibilities over dispositional issues from other relationships between courts
and administrative agencies, and which makes inappropriate both the
deference accorded to the agency in G.F. and the application of principles of exhaustion discussed in JS.
These decisions in G.F. and JS. suggest that in an attempt to reconcile limitations on the juvenile court's review powers with its undisputed obligation to exercise some degree of judicial oversight of
agency decisions, appellate courts may be driven to such extremes of
logic as the application of static principles of contract law to the dynamic process of child development.' 76 Permanency goals may
change, relationships between children and their caregivers may
evolve, and external circumstances may render previously workable
plans unworkable.' 77 If a court is to exercise effective oversight of its
174. While the decision in J. imposes a substantial limitation on judicial oversight of
agency discretion, it does not leave the trial court entirely without means to enforce its will.
The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the juvenile court's denial of the minor's injunction request, brought under a statute allowing orders to guard against "conduct that 'may
be detrimental or harmful to the child, and will tend to defeat the execution of the order
of disposition.'" Id. at 661 (quoting VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 661(2)). Yet in applying an
abuse of discretion standard of review to this aspect of the lower court's holding, the reviewing court implicitly recognizes that the lower court should receive deference in exercising its authority to grant injunctive relief to protect minors-an authority no less
expansive than the authority to reject a recommended placement as against the child's
best interests. Id. at 663.
175. Indeed, in the face of such a narrow view of the juvenile court's oversight authority,
it is difficult to understand what purpose is served by requiring the agency to seek initial
approval of a dispositional plan.
176. See, e.g., jS., 571 A.2d at 662-63 (discussing the limited authority of the juvenile
court with respect to placement decisions of agencies); In re G.F., 455 A.2d 805, 810 (Vt.
1982) (holding that courts only have authority to accept or reject an agency proposal, not
to rewrite it).
177. Cf INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUVENILE
JUSTICE STANDARDS

STANDARns RELATING TO APPEALS AND COLLATERAL REVIEW §

6.1 (1980)

("The circumstances of a child's life change more rapidly and are subject to a wider range

of external factors than is true for most adults. Children move from childhood to adolescence to adulthood in a relatively short period of time. In addition, total family situations
are often fluid, with the child being able to exercise little control over his or her environment"); In re Welfare of C. Children, 348 N.W.2d 94, 99 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (granting
the juvenile court power to modify dispositions "because such decisions frequently must be
made quickly to protect the child").
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wards, it must have the power to exercise its authority beyond the
point at which a legal custodian is appointed.
To be sure, the protection of an inner core of agency discretion is
a desirable objective.' 17 With good cause, courts repeatedly have recognized the wisdom and importance of deferring certain judgments
to administrative agencies chartered to manage the day-to-day responsibilities of caring for displaced children. Yet the forces that move
bureaucracies are complex, and cannot always be relied on to move
agencies in the direction of meeting the "best interests" of individual
wards of the court. A compelling case for judicial circumvention of
administrative remedies can be made based on at least three general
types of circumstances, all of which relate to failings or inadequacies
of the administrative decision-making and review processes.
First, resource constraints may lead to decisions that are not in
the best interests of a particular child. For example, an agency with a
limited number of special residential placements available for children with severe behavioral disorders may reasonably choose to hold
those placements open for children who fit all admission criteria, even
if the placement is the best available option for a child who does not
meet those criteria but is in need of an immediate placement. 179 In
the same vein, an agency having difficulty finding foster homes where
large sibling groups can be placed may choose to hold open spaces in
such homes, even when this results in keeping other children needing
immediate placements in temporary shelter facilities for a longer period of time. This problem prompted the Division of Family Services

court to observe that "instances may occur wherein the best interests
of the child and of the agency may be divergent."8 ° Agency decisions
allocating scarce resources may thus have a negative impact on certain
wards in a manner that arguably is inconsistent with ajudge's respon-

178. SeeJS., 571 A.2d at 663 ("In any particular situation, the best interests of the child
'can not be insured by case plans made in such detail that [the Department of Social and
Rehabilitative Services (SRS)] is locked in to a particular course of action. SRS, as legal
custodian, must have the freedom to determine the appropriate placement of the juvenile,
and to make adaptations in the cased plan as changing circumstances require.'") (quoting
In re L.T., 545 A.2d 522, 524 (Vt 1988)).
179. See, e.g., In re Doe, 390 A.2d 390, 396 (R.I. 1978) ("The setting of priorities among
those who are deemed to be suitable candidates for treatment is most suitably performed
by the administrative agency rather than by a court."); In re Eaton, 757 P.2d 961, 965
(Wash. 1988) (en banc) ("We hold that the juvenile court does not have the authority to
select the placement facility because this authority has not been enumerated [by statute].
This holding enables [the agency] to fulfill its responsibility to all children in assuring that
those most needy receive the limited available openings.").
180. Division of Family Servs. v. State, 319 So. 2d 72, 77 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
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sibility to safeguard the best interests of the individual child before
the court."' 1
A second and perhaps more compelling basis for judicial activism
is the all-too-common problem of misfeasance by agency workers. A
case in point is the decision of the New York Family Court in In re
Daniel T.C."'8 The dispute in that case arose over a provision of the
juvenile court judge's order directing the agency to place two minors
with their maternal grandmother. The agency maintained that this
order exceeded the court's authority.1"" Though the principal issue
was one of statutory interpretation, the court indicated that it could
not rely on the agency to select a placement that would meet the children's interests. The basis for the court's concern was the agency's
failure, over a period of more than two years, either to monitor the
8 4
children or to take steps to move their cases toward permanency.1
These concerns prompted the court to note that "[t] he history of this
case illustrates a problem too prevalent in neglect proceedings before
this Court: the failure of [the agency] to monitor diligently and to
aggressively seek to serve the interests of children in its care.""8 5 In
the face of such circumstances, a court declining to interfere with the
agency's mismanagement of a child's case might fairly be charged
with failing to carry out its own responsibility to move the case toward
permanency. Speaking generally of administrative discretion, one
commentator has noted that
the quality of policy judgments made by agencies is highly
variable, so that great deference to agency expertise, and to
procedural insulation of the agency's decisionmaking against
public participation, will in practice mean broad acceptance

181. See id. ("EWe recognize the validity of the agency's concern for the loss of a facility
but that fear, though a legitimate interest of the agency, may not be permitted to interfere
with the best interests of the subject children.").
182. 532 N.Y.S.2d 474 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1988).
183. Id. at 475-76.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 479. In Chicago, the shortcomings and failings of agency caseworkers have
received increasing public scrutiny. Many of these caseworkers lack the training, experience, or qualifications that would merit deference from judicial officers. See Kuczka, supra
note 1. In addition, agency workers often carry caseloads that are so large as to make
sound, informed decision-making a practical impossibility. Id. Indeed, such problems
have reached the point where workers have been held in contempt of court, and even
sentenced to perform community service, as punishment for failing to keep the court apprised of the general status of state wards in foster care. See Ray Long, DCMh Caseworkers
Receive Trash Duty for Missing Court, CHI. SuN-TMEs, May 6, 1994, at News 5.
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by the judiciary of preventable misfeasance. It is difficult
to
18 6
count this as a valuable goal of administrative law.
Finally, administrative procedures may, in some circumstances,
prove ill-equipped to respond to an urgent request for review. In
many states, agencies continue to devote only limited resources to fair
hearing processes and may not even have formal emergency review
processes in place.1a7 Courts, on the other hand, are accustomed to
conducting emergency review hearings and therefore may be better
equipped to respond quickly when the need arises. Where children
may suffer irreparable harm from placement in an inappropriate setting for even a short period of time,' the ability of a review system to
respond quickly to urgent requests is of critical importance. The hypothetical case described at the outset of this Article 8 9 offers but one
example in which rapid review of a potentially harmful decision-a
decision which the agency has refused to stay or reconsider-may be
imperative to safeguard the child's well-being.
At least one court has suggested that removing the agency as legal
guardian is a sufficient remedy in a case in which the agency fails in its
duty. 190 Yet for several reasons, this solution may be unsatisfying. In
many states, child welfare services are provided by a single administrative agency funded largely through the federal Adoption Assistance
and Child Welfare Act. Under this Act, the functions of case planning
and case monitoring that are meant to drive movement toward an appropriate stable plan for a child or family are required only for children under the legal responsibility of the single federally-funded state
186. Edley, supra note 135, at 600. Edley's comment rings particularly true as applied to
child welfare agencies which are perennially plagued by underfunding and a host of related problems, giving rise to numerous lawsuits across the country. See supra note 3 and
accompanying text.
187. See Shotton & Henry, supra note 14, at 3-4.
188. See generally GOLDSTElN ET AL., supra note 110, at 40-43 (stressing the importance of
permanency for the psychological well-being of children); CHRISTOPHER M. HEINECKE &
ILSEJ. WESTHEIMER, BIEF SEPARATIONS (1965) ("Each time (a] child is removed ....
there
is damage done to her capacity to establish meaningful relationships, to feel secure about
herself."); Interview with Joseph Goldstein, 12 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 575, 575 (198384); Peg Hess, Parent-Child Attachment Concept: Crucialfor Permanency Planning, 63 Soc.
CASEWORK 46, 47-48 (1982) ("When the child experiences inconsistent care .... [the child]
may develop a less than optimum attachment with the parent, and will experience and
demonstrate permanent impairment in the capacity to form human attachments .
").
189. See supra Part I.A.
190. In re G.B., 418 N.W.2d 258, 260 (Neb. 1988) ("Under the statute, if the juvenile
court finds that the placement selected by the department is not in a child's best interests
and that some other placement would better serve those interests, the court is free to
remove the child from the custody of the department and place the child wherever the
court concludes best meets the child's needs.").
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agency. 19 1 Access to critical services in many circumstances may thus
be dependent on the involvement of the agency,' 9 2 and relieving the
agency of its responsibility when it fails in its function-rather than
providing it with the direction of a court order-may work to the detriment of the child. 193
At some point, then, and in some manner, when the interests of
state wards are not adequately protected by the responsible agency,
juvenile courts must be equipped to take affirmative measures, short
of relieving the agency entirely of its responsibility, to safeguard the
interests of their wards. This duty derives from the fundamental authority of such courts-an authority recognized almost universally in
state statutes-to protect children once cause for state intervention
has been established.
V.

DETERMINING WHEN JUDICIAL REVIEW SHOULD BE ALLOWED

A.

Application of the Doctrine of PrimaryJurisdiction

This critique suggests the importance of flexibility in applicable
principles ofjudicial review that balance the court's ultimate responsibility against the wisdom of deference to sound agency decisions. At
bottom, the problem may be better cast as one of timing rather than
of determining an appropriate standard of review. If resort to the juvenile court follows the full treatment of the issue in an administrative
proceeding, where all parties have had notice and an opportunity to
be heard in a setting affording due process protections, then the court
has the benefit of a fully developed record to explain and support the
agency's conclusions. Under such circumstances, there is little reason
not to apply standards traditionally applicable to judicial review of administrative action, under which the conclusions of the agency are left
191. See supra note 24.
192. For example, in the Chicago, Illinois area, parents whose service plans include a
requirement that they attend drug rehabilitation programs and whose children are in foster care receive priority in the allocation of limited openings for such programs. Because
waiting lists may be months long, a parent's ability to secure needed services quickly
enough to avoid permanent separation from her children may thus be dependent on a
referral from the state child welfare agency. Rob Karwath et al., FixingFamiliesfrom Scratch,
CH. TRIB., Mar. 8, 1994, at 1.
193. For example, in Daniel T.C., the children's law guardian argued that the agency
should not be relieved of legal responsibility, despite the agency's failure to provide services or monitor the cases of two siblings in foster care with their grandmother. In re Daniel
T.C., 532 N.Y.S.2d 474, 476-77 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1988). The law guardian took this position
because she believed that the children and the family would not be supervised and assisted
adequately, and because at the end of the initial 18-month placement, the caregiver would
be unable, without the assistance of the agency, to seek an extension of the placement,
thus leaving the children in legal "limbo." Id. at 477.
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intact unless they are clearly against the weight of the evidence or
deemed an abuse of discretion. 194 Conversely, if an agency's decision
has not been tested by an administrative review process, and therefore
is unaccompanied by the reliability that accompanies such scrutiny,
there is little reason to apply a heightened degree of deference to the
decision. Thus, once a juvenile court has undertaken to treat an issue
within its jurisdiction, it should apply the same standards applicable to
any de novo judicial hearing. It is presumed here that if a court
chooses to exercise jurisdiction over an issue which has yet to be subjected to administrative review, it should afford whatever deference
the recommendations of the agency warrant, based upon the qualifications, experience, and persuasiveness of the persons supporting the
agency's position.
° A more difficult question arises in determining whether judicial
review of a question should go forward when the issue presented to
the court falls within the purview of the agency's review processes, but
agency review either has not been initiated or has not been completed. On what basis should courts address dispositional issues
before administrative review of these issues has been completed?
In other contexts, relationships between administrative agencies
and courts have been defined by a variety of administrative gatekeeping doctrines, including the doctrines of exhaustion, finality, ripeness,
and primary jurisdiction. 195 In some respect, each of these gatekeeping devices defines the point in time when a court may address issues
subject to review by an administrative agency. While application of
these various devices has been marked by significant overlap and confusion,19 6 several fairly consistent and distinguishing themes emerge
from a review of case law and literature defining these doctrines.
These themes suggest that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is well
194. Reviewing courts commonly have applied an abuse of discretion or clearly erroneous standard in reviewing actions of a child welfare agency. See, e.g., In re B.L.J., 717 P.2d
376, 380 (Alaska 1986) ("[T] he abuse of discretion standard of review is appropriate when
the court is presented with agency actions on matters committed to the agency's discretion."); In re Doe, 784 P.2d 873, 880 (Haw. Ct. App. 1989) ("The conclusion is reviewed
under the abuse of discretion standard."); O'Bryan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 594 P.2d
739, 741 (Nev. 1979) (stating that agency decisions will be set aside only if they are arbitrary or illegal); cf. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988) (describing scope
of judicial review of federal administrative action).
195. See generally R. George Wright, The Timing of JudicialReview of Administrative Decisions: The Use and Abuse of OverlappingDoctrines, 11 Am. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 83, 84-91 (1987Y
(discussing the meaning and application of these doctrines).
196. Id. at 83-91; see also Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FrC, 814 F.2d 731, 732, 745, 750 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (holding that federal court review of constitutional challenge to FTC's
prosecutorial authority was precluded, with each of three judges arguing, respectively, that
decision should rest on grounds of exhaustion, finality, and ripeness).
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suited to analyzing the proper contours of the boundaries between
juvenile courts and child welfare agencies.
Both the prudential doctrines of exhaustion and primary jurisdiction recognize that judicial review of a subject may be permitted, even
when circumstances compel judicial deference to administrative
processes. 19 7 Though both doctrines contemplate a balancing of factors to determine whether judicial review is appropriate, the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction more clearly contemplates areas of shared and
overlapping authority.' 98 The Supreme Court addressed the difference between exhaustion and primary jurisdiction in the leading case
of United States v. Western Pacific Railway Co.,' 9 9 in which the Court deferred to the Interstate Commerce Commission the determination of
whether napalm bomb cases shipped without fuses were subject to a
higher tariff applicable to incendiary devices. The Court defined the
two doctrines as follows:
"Exhaustion" applies where a claim is cognizable in the first
instance by an administrative agency alone; judicial interference is withheld until the administrative process has run its
course. "Primary jurisdiction," on the other hand, applies
where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and
comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires
the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme,
have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative
body for its views.20
197. In his opinion in Ticor Title, Judge Williams distinguished between "prudential"
judge-made administrative doctrines such as exhaustion and ripeness, which typically permit a more flexible balancing of factors to determine whether judicial review is appropriate, and "jurisdictional" gatekeeping doctrines such as the doctrine of finality. Ticor Title,
814 F.2d at 746; see also McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-95 (1969) (describing
competing factors in determining whether judicial review is barred by the failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Selective Service Act). As a prudential doctrine,
primary jurisdiction provides courts with significant discretion in its application. See
United States v. Henri, 828 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The doctrine of primary jurisdiction, despite what the term may imply, does not speak to the jurisdictional power of the
federal courts.") (quoting United States v. Bessemer & Lake Erie R.R., 717 F.2d 593, 599
(D.C. Cir. 1983)).
198. Thus, while exhaustion contemplates a situation where initial authority to consider
an issue lies exclusively with the agency, primary jurisdiction contemplates a situation
where both the agency and the court have the legal capacity to deal with a matter, but
where judicial review may be withheld out of deference to the agency's experience or expertise. Mountain States Nat'l Gas Corp. v. Petroleum Corp., 693 F.2d 1015, 1019 (10th
Cir. 1982).
199. 352 U.S. 59 (1956).
200. Id. at 63-64.
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A court customarily invokes primary jurisdiction when a litigant
initially seeks judicial redress but the court determines that an initial
administrative resolution of some aspect of the dispute would facilitate a resolution.2 0 1 The application of the doctrine by the Supreme
Court strongly suggests that each case should be considered sui
generis, with consideration of individual circumstances dictating
whether the court should preempt agency treatment of an issue: "No
fixed formula exists for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
In every case the question is whether the reasons for the existence of
the doctrine are present and whether the purposes it serves will be
aided by its application in the particular litigation." 2
Among the significant issues that must be weighed in this balance
is the cost to the litigants of delaying judicial review in favor of an
administrative process.2 0 3 For example, in Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile
Exchange,20 4 a plaintiff aggrieved by the defendant's decision to revoke
and transfer his seat filed an antitrust action in federal court. 205 The
majority concluded that the plaintiffs claim would more fairly be resolved by first permitting the Commodity Exchange Commission to
consider whether the plaintiff's conduct violated its rules.2 6 In challenging the majority's view that the plaintiff suffered no overriding
prejudice from requiring administrative review,207 Justice Marshall
made explicit the calculus implicit in the majority opinion:
To be sure, judicial deference to agency jurisdiction remains
important, particularly in those areas where the responsibilities of judges and administrators meet and overlap. But the
primary jurisdiction doctrine, like the related exhaustion requirement, must not be "applied blindly in every case" without "an understanding of its purposes and of the particular
administrative scheme involved." Wise use of the doctrine
201. See, e.g., Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 291 (1973) (determining
that district court was required to reserve its ruling pending evaluation of the plaintiff's
conduct by the Commodity Exchange Commission in antitrust challenge to defendant's
transfer of his seat on the exchange); Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 68-69 (1970) (deferring to the responsible agency on
the question of the validity of certain charges in suit to recover harbor charges from shippers); see generally4 DAvis, supra note 52, § 22:1, at 82 (discussing the nature, function, and
significance of primary jurisdiction issues as they relate to the relationship between courts
and agencies).
202. Western Pac., 352 U.S. at 64.
203. As previously discussed, the issue of delay is particularly relevant in the child welfare context. See supra notes 187-189 and accompanying text.
204. 409 U.S. 289 (1973).
205. Ricci, 409 U.S. at 290-91.
206. Id. at 306.
207. 1&Lat 304-05 n.14.
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necessitates a careful balance of the benefits to be derived
from utilization of agency processes as against the costs in
complication and delay. Where the plaintiff has no means of
invoking agency jurisdiction, where the agency rules do not
guarantee the plaintiff a means of participation in the administrative proceedings, and where the likelihood of a
meaningful agency input into the judicial process is remote,
I would strike a balance in favor of immediate court action.
Since the majority's scale is20apparently
differently calibrated,
8
I must respectfully dissent.
With respect to dispositional issues, the relationship of overlapping authority contemplated by the Supreme Court in Western Pacific
offers an apt analogy to the division of responsibility between juvenile
courts and child welfare agencies. It is undisputed that agencies carry
an initial responsibility for making decisions about the placement of
children under their care. Nor is there doubt that juvenile courts
carry ultimate responsibility for making decisions about the legal custody of state wards and for granting ultimate approval of dispositional
plans, or that juvenile courts are generally free to correct obvious
abuses of agency discretion. The challenge thus posed for courts sharing responsibility with child welfare agencies is to find effective ways to
resolve disputes that fall within these outer limits. The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction offers an effective and flexible device for resolving problems of overlapping jurisdiction.
B.

Some Suggested Criteriafor Resolving JurisdictionalConflicts

Under the principles of law advocated by this Article, a juvenile
court judge presented with a request, similar to that made by Patrick's
law guardian, 2 9 would be obliged to consider the full range of circumstances of the particular case in deciding whether or not to preempt administrative review processes. In addition to exploring the
individual circumstances of a particular case, a court would also need
to consider a variety of institutional characteristics of both the court
208. Id. at 321 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting McKart v. United
States, 395 U.S. 185, 193, 201 (1969)). In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas
echoed this theme, stating that
[t] he odds of petitioner's getting the Commodity Exchange Commission now to
find a violation in contradiction of its past inaction do not, in my view, justify the
expense and delay to the petitioner....
The road this litigant is now required to travel to obtain justice is equally
long and expensive and available only to those with long purses, even though he
is remitted only to a federal regulatory agency.
Id. at 309 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
209. See supra Part I.A.
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and the administrative agency affecting their respective abilities to
provide prompt, considered, and procedurally adequate responses to
a given problem. The issues that are identified in the following section are offered not as an exhaustive list, but rather as a starting point
in discussing the circumstances under which, in the application of
flexible principles of case management, judicial intervention should
preempt administrative review.
1. Does the Urgency of the Situation CompelJudicialIntervention?-In
Patrick's case, 1 ' the impetus for judicial preemption of administrative
processes derives primarily from the sense of urgency behind the request for judicial review of the agency's decision to place. The agency
has demonstrated its intent to place the child in a setting that, because of its distance from his current foster home, will effectively sever
his relationship with his foster parent. Moreover, the agency has indicated that it plans to implement its placement decision before review
through normal administrative fair hearing processes can take place.
There can be little doubt that the interests at stake are central to the
court's responsibility to protect Patrick's welfare. Patrick's law guardian has argued that the child will suffer permanent harm if the agency
moves him to a residential setting, and effectively severs his relationship with his primary caregiver. The law guardian has argued further
that effective review of the placement decision must precede its implementation, because the harm of the change, once done, cannot be
undone. Moreover, were Patrick to be returned to his former foster
parent pursuant to a decision that the original placement change was
inappropriate, the additional disruption of another placement change
would in all likelihood compound the harm to the child. The court's
refusal to conduct an immediate review of the decision thus would
constitute de facto approval of the agency action, with any effective
subsequent review precluded by limitations on the court's power to
grant relief after the fact.
In Patrick's case, it is presumed that effective administrative
processes would be available but for the need for a prompt resolution
of the challenge raised by the child's law guardian. Where such
processes do exist, and where effective review of a dispute could be
achieved through either an administrative or a judicial forum, the
principal concern will be over the timing of the review process. In
other words, the focus of the court's inquiry into the particular circumstances of a case will generally be on whether the urgency of the

210. See supra Part I.A.
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request for judicial review compels circumvention of administrative
processes.
In practice, an inquiry into the level of urgency may be difficult to
distinguish from a more searching inquiry into the ultimate merits of
the dispute. A judge seeking to determine whether judicial intervention is warranted in Patrick's case must begin by considering the nature of his attachment to his caregiver and the harm that may follow if
this attachment is broken. This same question will be central to the
ultimate issue of whether the planned placement change should be
barred. Nevertheless, the threshold inquiry into whether judicial review is warranted and the subsequent inquiry into whether relief
should be granted, though marked by overlapping issues, are distinct
in kind. To justify judicial review, the court need determine only that
the planned placement change will interfere with a significant relationship in a manner that may jeopardize the child's best interests,
and that any effective review of the change will be precluded by the
court's failure to intervene prior to its implementation. Consideration of the merits of the law guardian's request for review, on the
other hand, will require a more detailed review of the circumstances
of Patrick's case and a more searching balancing of interests.
Patrick's case thus suggests several specific questions germane to
a court's determination of whether or not to preempt administrative
review: (i) What is the nature of the interest at stake, and does the
dispute implicate the court's responsibility to safeguard this interest?;
(ii) Might the child be harmed if the planned action goes forward?;
and (iii) Will the failure to review the planned decision effectively preclude further review?
2. Are Administrative Review Processes Adequate?-A related,
though somewhat more generalized inquiry, addresses the nature and
adequacy of administrative review processes. Governing federal law
requires states to provide an opportunity for administrative fair hearings to certain persons aggrieved by actions of a state child welfare
agency."' Yet federal oversight of the Adoption Assistance Act has
been limited,21 2 and federal regulations implementing this requirement offer little guidance as to the requisite parameters of a fair hear-

211. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(12) (1988).
212. See Shotton & Henry, supra note 14, at 1 ("[S] tates have often been resistent [sic] to
implementing fair hearing procedures ... and the Department of Health and Human
Services... generally has not forced the issue.").
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ing system. 213 As a result, fair hearing processes vary widely from state
2 14
to state, and in many states fair hearings occur only infrequently.
Therefore, it cannot be assumed that the fair hearing process invariably affords a complainant with effective administrative review.
Before an applicant forjudicial review fairly can be limited to administrative remedies, ajuvenile court judge should be confident that
the administrative review process is both accessible and adequate.
Several specific questions will be relevant to this inquiry:
(i) Would the applicant for judicial review have standing to seek
review of the disputed issue through the administrative fair hearing
process? Beyond identifying "applicants" for or "recipients" of benefits as persons for whom hearings should be allowed, 215 federal regulations do not define parties entitled to seek a fair hearing, and state
regulations vary widely in their definitions. In Illinois, for example,
foster parents may only appeal certain types of placement changes
through the fair hearing process. 2 16 In Patrick's case, apart from the
interest of his law guardian and her ability to pursue available administrative remedies, a court's refusal to allow judicial review potentially
precludes any review of an issue if state regulations would prohibit Ms.
Glenn from seeking administrative review of a placement decision.
(ii) Would all other interested parties be entitled to participate in
the administrative process? Agency regulations may not, for example,
include provisions permitting a parent to participate in a fair hearing
over a change in substitute care held at the request of a foster parent.
Under such circumstances, a judge could not be assured that the administrative decision would be binding upon persons not party to the
process, raising the possibility of duplicative judicial hearings.
213. 45 C.F.R. § 1355.30 (1993) provides that regulations implementing fair hearing
requirements for federally-funded public benefit programs shall also apply to programs
under Titles IV-B and IV-E of the Adoption Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-628 and
§§ 670-679 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), which govern child welfare programs and foster care.
Applicable regulations do not indicate either the types of service decisions that must be
appealable or the persons who may seek review of agency decisions. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R.
§ 205.10 (1993) (describing the administrative requirements for hearings).
214. Shotton & Henry, supra note 14, at 1.
215. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(5) (1993).
216. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 337.70 (1993); cf. California Department of Social
Services Manual, Chapter 22-001(c) (10/30/90) (excepting foster parent requests for
hearings on placement changes from regular fair hearing processes); PA. ADMIN. CODE, tit.
55, § 3700.73(a) (foster parents may appeal the relocation of a child from the foster family
unless the child has been with the foster family less than six months, the removal is initiated by the court, the removal is to return the child to his parents or place the child for
adoption, or the removal is to protect the child from injury); TExAS ADMIN. CODE tit. 40,
§ 700.301 (1992) (permitting "child protective services clients" fair hearings to contest the
denial, reduction, or termination of services).
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(iii) Do fair hearing rules provide adequate due process protections? Federal regulations 2 17 require that state fair hearing processes
shall meet the due process standards described by the Supreme Court
in Goldberg v. Kelly. 2 18 Because the issues at stake in a dispute over
placement may involve fundamental interests, a court should be satisfied that any party held to administrative remedies will receive adequate due process protections.
(iv) Does the administrative process permit timely review?
Though federal regulations require "[p]rompt, definitive, and final
administrative action" to be completed within ninety days of a request
for a hearing, 2 19 hearings often take significantly longer. 22 0 If an
agency's record demonstrates it is unlikely to provide timely review, a
juvenile court should be permitted to take account of this record in
order to ensure that effective and timely review of a decision occurs in
some forum. In addition, a court should consider whether the agency
process permits expedited or emergency review. While it is often assumed that courts are better suited to handle emergency requests for
injunctive or other relief, deference to an agency may be appropriate
if it is able to provide effective review of contested decisions on an
emergency basis.
3. Is Review by aJuvenile Court Consistent with the Interests ofJudicial
Economy ?--Questions as to where the interests of judicial economy lie
encompass at least two distinct issues: (1) concern over the prospect
of duplicative reviews, and (2) the relative value of the resources required, respectively, for judicial and administrative review processes.
The most pointed concern raised by the shared jurisdiction of separate administrative and judicial review processes stems from the prospect of duplicative proceedings. If significant resources have already
been devoted to an administrative review process that is complete or
nearly complete when the question is first presented to the court, it
will be difficult to justify a de novo judicial hearing. If judicial review
under such circumstances is unwarranted, ajudge may stay any part of
a proceeding pending the outcome of the administrative action, and
may treat the final administrative decision under standards prescribed
by state administrative procedure acts. Conversely, if the matter is
217. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(1)(ii) (1993).
218. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
219. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a) (16) (1993).
220. This problem is not new. An assessment of state fair hearing practices in the welfare arena, conducted in the wake of the decision in Goldberg v. Kely, noted frequent delays
beyond the hearing deadlines. See DANIELJ. BAUM, THE WELFARE FAMILY AND MASS ADMINIS-

TmA E JusaicE 39-40 (1974).
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presented to the court when a dispute first arises, prior to any administrative review of the agency's decision, comparatively less cause exists
for a court to defer to agency review processes. Moreover, if a judge
chooses to proceed with a hearing on an issue also subject to administrative review, an administrative hearing officer who learns of a potentially preemptive judicial process would have cause to refrain from
proceeding with an administrative hearing.
To avoid duplicative hearings, it is critical that each potential arbiter of an issue has knowledge of any conflicting or potentially conflicting process. If the judge and the administrative officer are each
aware of the status of proceedings in the other forum, steps can be
taken in either forum to avoid duplicative hearings. Moreover, the
same parties and individuals-including the parent, the child, and the
agency-will usually be involved in both fora. Because it normally will
be in at least one party's interest to apprise the adjudicator of a potential conflict, the prospect that both processes might proceed simultaneously seems unlikely.
The greater concern-and the more problematic question for a
judge-arises when an issue is presented to the juvenile court judge
after administrative review has been undertaken but before it has
been completed. Under such circumstances, in order to determine
whether judicial review should proceed, the court should inquire into
whether the applicant for judicial review was aware of the ongoing
administrative process but failed to seek a timely stay of administrative
review, and whether the applicant appears to be engaging in forum
shopping. The court might also consider whether aspects of the administrative process that have already been undertaken-such as administrative discovery-might lessen the burden imposed on the
court by judicial review, thereby minimizing concerns about the duplication of functions.
A somewhat different concern regarding the interests of judicial
economy relates to the relative value of judicial and administrative
hearing resources. Deference to administrative agencies commonly
rests in part on the assumption that judicial resources are comparatively more precious than administrative resources, whether by virtue
of judicial caseloads, higher costs associated with judicial hearings,2 2 '
or other unidentified factors. The disparity in resources varies, however, depending on the nature of the administrative review process
and the extent to which attorneys and other necessary parties are
221. Attorney's fees and salaries for support staff are two sources of the increased costs
of judicial hearings.
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equally taxed by an administrative hearing. To the extent that the
administrative process is less costly, consideration of judicial economy
may reasonably support a presumption that administrative review
should be applied.
4. Is the Administrative Agency Better Suited to Resolve an Issue By
Virtue of SuperiorExpertise or Experience?-According to Professor Davis,
when a court and an agency have concurrent jurisdiction to decide a
question, the most common reason for a court to defer initial treatment of the question is that "the judges, who usually deem themselves
to be relatively the generalists, should not act on a question until the
administrators, who may be relatively the specialists, have acted on
it. " "' While this assumption may provide an appropriate starting
point for evaluating the relative levels of expertise of judicial and administrative adjudicators," resolution of this issue in a specific case
requires a more searching inquiry into the nature of the specific juvenile court. As noted above,2 2 4 judges in some jurisdictions focus exclusively on family law issues, and judges in other jurisdictions focus
even more narrowly on child dependency cases. Through such focused experience, a judge may have superior knowledge about the
types of issues faced by litigants in child welfare cases, or about resources available to assess and meet those needs. Conversely, as is
often the case with administrative hearings for state agencies, the responsibility for conducting administrative hearings may fall on attorneys whose involvement with the agency consists of periodic and
comparatively limited contract work,22 offering at best a restricted opportunity to develop the type of experience or expertise that would
make a hearing officer especially qualified to adjudicate certain types
of issues.
In either forum, the presiding officer presumably will be called
upon to hear and evaluate information from child welfare and other
professionals. While an experienced administrative hearing officer
may demonstrate superior strengths in understanding aspects of the
child welfare system that might be germane to a particular dispute, a
judge's experience in evaluating expert testimony or weighing com222. 4 DAVIS, supra note 52, § 22:1, at 82.
223. Presumably, an adjudicatory officer presiding over a dispute resolution process,
whether in a judicial or an administrative forum, will rely in large part on information and
opinions of professionals responsible for, or otherwise involved in, the case.
224. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
225. In Illinois, for example, the only required qualification for administrative law

judges in child welfare cases is that they be licensed attorneys with some knowledge relevant to child welfare. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 337.180 (1993).
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peting recommendations may prove more valuable in a given context.
Thus, while focus on the experience of individual judges or hearing
officers will generally be both impractical and inappropriate, it nevertheless should be possible to identify institutional aspects or characteristics of the two competing systems that bear on the qualifications of
each to resolve certain types of disputes. Accordingly, it cannot and
should not be presumed in every case that the experience of the administrative officer is more specialized or superior to that of ajuvenile
court judge, who in some jurisdictions may well be, relatively speaking, the specialist.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Under a prudential rule governed by the principles underlying
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the delineation of factors that will
determine when a court should preempt administrative review will
vary with the circumstances of each case. Critical to this discussion is
the distinction between an absolute jurisdictional bar, which prohibits
judicial review of particular types of decisions, and a prudential rule
that recognizes judicial authority but counsels restraint when the dictates of judicial economy or administrative expertise encourage deference. A more flexible prudential rule still provides the juvenile court
with a basis for deferring to the agency under appropriate circumstances, but permits juvenile courts to determine whether or not to
exercise judicial authority, taking account of the full range of circumstances particular to each individual case. This balance, it is believed,
is the only way to ensure the juvenile court's ultimate ability to safeguard the interests and well-being of children in state care.

